Recently, in connection with the bankruptcy case of KB Toys, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed a claim held by a claim purchaser, citing that the original holder of the claim had received a preference payment prior to the bankruptcy case.¹ The ruling affirmed an earlier decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which we discussed in a previous memorandum², in which the Bankruptcy Court held that (i) a claim in the hands of a transferee has the same rights and disabilities as the claim had in the hands of the original claimant; and (ii) disabilities attach t

An important decision by Judge Kevin Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently focused the distressed debt market (and financial creditors in general) on the proper legal characterization of a common financing provision — the “make-whole premium.”¹ Judge Carey allowed a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for the full amount of a large make-whole premium, after denying a motion by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee to disallow the claim.

 WHY DOES THIS DECISION MATTER?

The U.S. bankruptcy claims trading market has grown in recent years, from one with a few specialized firms investing in small vendor trade claims into a multibillion dollar industry. Major investment banks and hedge funds now regularly buy and sell claims arising from a variety of transactions, including swap terminations, litigation judgments, debt issuances and rejected real estate and equipment leases. With individual claim amounts frequently in the millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars, the volume of claims bought and sold has increased significantly.

A problem frequently faced by landlords in the current economic climate is that of tenants who time their entry into administration so that it takes place just after rent payable in advance on a quarter day has fallen due. This growing practice has left landlords frustrated and out of pocket.

In our last issue, we looked at the implications for out-of-court administrations where the company or directors seek to appoint an administrator under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, but then discover that between filing their notice of intention to appoint and their notice of appointment, a winding-up petition has been presented, triggering paragraph 25 of the Schedule. Paragraph 25 prevents the appointment of an administrator under paragraph 22 where there is a pending winding-up petition.

The ISDA Master Agreement¹ serves as the basis for the vast majority of overthe- counter derivatives transactions. Two fundamental principles of the ISDA Master Agreement are: (1) upon the default of one party to a swap, the nondefaulting counterparty may terminate the swap, calculate its loss and claim damages; and (2) the obligation of each party to a swap to make payments to the other is subject to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent that no default has occurred with respect to the other party.

According to a recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision, avoidance and disallowance risk travel with a distressed claim. This decision highlights the importance of diligence and the benefits provided by purchasing distressed debt on “distressed” documents.

The debt of a troubled company is trading in the secondary market at a significant discount because the company is highly levered and is at risk of default.

T he LBIE Client Money Judgment on the appeal from the Court of Appeal has been eagerly awaited by creditors and secondary claims trading market participants in order to give clarity to the funds available for the client money pool and to determine which clients will have the benefit of those funds.

The decision has implications for creditors of MF Global UK Limited and all clients of UK financial firms.

BACKGROUND

Greece is proceeding with the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history after its bondholders accepted a significant debt reduction in the face of mounting evidence that a Greek default was inevitable without such relief. In a related market development garnering only slightly less attention than the debt restructuring itself, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.

T he recent—and unexpected—rejection by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the modified plan of reorganization of Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WaMu”)² on the ground of a “colorable claim” of insider trading has raised questions about the standards of conduct for members of ad hoc creditors committees during corporate reorganizations.³ In WaMu, Judge Mary F.