T he recent—and unexpected—rejection by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the modified plan of reorganization of Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WaMu”)2 on the ground of a “colorable claim” of insider trading has raised questions about the standards of conduct for members of ad hoc creditors committees during corporate reorganizations.3 In WaMu, Judge Mary F.
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In Canada legislative authority is divided between the federal and provincial governments by subject matter. "Bankruptcy and insolvency" is a matter of federal jurisdiction, while "property and civil rights" is generally within the jurisdiction of the provinces.
On January 25, 2010, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge James M. Peck issued a decision that limited the ability of parties to swap transactions to enforce certain of their contractual rights against a counterparty that has filed for bankruptcy. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.1 (the “BNY Decision”).
Although originating from equity, declared but unpaid dividends have historically been treated as debt claims by courts in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).1 Following the coming into force of the CCAA amendments in September 2009, a fresh look at the characterization of claims as debt or equity is being undertaken.
On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court approved certain amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requiring disclosures by certain creditors and equity holders in Chapter 11 cases. We expect that amended Rule 20191 (“Amended Rule 2019”) will take effect as a matter of law on December 1, 2011 unless in the interim Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules, which we view as unlikely.
On April 25, 2011, as widely expected, a group of Lehman creditors holding claims arising from terminated derivatives transactions filed a competing plan of reorganization and related disclosure statement in the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. As a result of the new filing, there are now three competing plans – (1) the Debtors’ Plan, (2) the Ad Hoc Group’s Plan (filed by a group of bondholder creditors) and (3) the Non-Consolidation Plan (filed by the derivative claimants) - in the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings.
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On April 7, 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered a decision in the restructuring proceedings involving Indalex Limited (Indalex) under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) that is inconsistent with prior non-binding comments by the same court relating to the priority of certain pension claims. The decision has material implications for institutional financiers that lend against the inventory, accounts receivable or cash collateral of businesses with Ontario regulated defined benefit pension plans and for the access of those businesses to secured credit.
The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.
Does this sound familiar? A newly formed entity purchases distressed bank debt after the debtor has proposed a reorganization plan. The purchaser obtains a blocking position and uses its negotiating leverage to obtain control of the plan process and ultimately the borrower’s assets, which have strategic importance to the purchaser.