T he recent—and unexpected—rejection by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the modified plan of reorganization of Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WaMu”)2 on the ground of a “colorable claim” of insider trading has raised questions about the standards of conduct for members of ad hoc creditors committees during corporate reorganizations.3 In WaMu, Judge Mary F.
On September 13, 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) approved a final rule (the “Final Rules”) to be issued jointly by the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Board”) intended to implement section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) which requires each non-bank financial company supervised by the Board and each bank holding company with assets of US$50 billion or more (each, a “Covered Company”)1 to report periodically to the Board, the FDIC and the Financial Stability Oversig
On January 25, 2010, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge James M. Peck issued a decision that limited the ability of parties to swap transactions to enforce certain of their contractual rights against a counterparty that has filed for bankruptcy. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.1 (the “BNY Decision”).
On the bill of the Federal German Government for an Act Serving the Further Facilitation of the Reorganization of Enterprises (ESUG)
On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court approved certain amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requiring disclosures by certain creditors and equity holders in Chapter 11 cases. We expect that amended Rule 20191 (“Amended Rule 2019”) will take effect as a matter of law on December 1, 2011 unless in the interim Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules, which we view as unlikely.
On April 25, 2011, as widely expected, a group of Lehman creditors holding claims arising from terminated derivatives transactions filed a competing plan of reorganization and related disclosure statement in the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. As a result of the new filing, there are now three competing plans – (1) the Debtors’ Plan, (2) the Ad Hoc Group’s Plan (filed by a group of bondholder creditors) and (3) the Non-Consolidation Plan (filed by the derivative claimants) - in the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings.
A senior creditor can obtain significant leverage over a chapter 11 debtor if it is able to vote not only its claim but the claims of junior creditors in connection with the solicitation of a plan of reorganization. Obtaining such leverage, however, has proven problematic in the past. Among other things, courts have been reluctant to enforce pre-bankruptcy assignments or waivers of voting rights contained in intercreditor agreements, holding that such assignments or waivers may violate the Bankruptcy Code and rules. In Avondale Gateway Center Entitlement, LLC v.
The English law scheme of arrangement (or “scheme”) has re-emerged as a favoured tool of choice for those engaged in complex financial restructurings, in particular where a consensual solution may not be capable of implementation. This bulletin focuses on the key terms of the most high profile recent schemes, including those of WIND Hellas, La Seda, European Directories and Cattles, and identifies current hot topics and market trends.
Background
In its continued effort to implement its authority to resolve “covered financial companies” under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), on March 15, 2011, the Board of Directors of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) approved the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Proposed Rules”).
The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.