In four judgments of 26 June 2012, case refs.: XI ZR 259 / 11, XI ZR 316 / 11, XI ZR 355 / 10 and XI ZR 356 / 10, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has again stated its position on the question of when there is a duty to disclose commission. In all four cases the investors purchased certificates from the same defendant bank to invest different amounts and these certificates turned out to be largely worthless following the insolvency of the issuer (Lehman Brothers Treasury Co. B.V.) and the guarantor (Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.) in September 2008.

In two recent judgments, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) dealt with the resistance to insolvency of the statutory claim for deletion of a land charge and the resistance to insolvency of the claim for restitution of higher or equal ranking land charges which has been assigned for security purposes. Abandoning its existing case law, the BGH answered the question of resistance to insolvency of the statutory claim for deletion from the register as per section 1179a of the German Civil Code in the affirmative in its judgment dated 27 April 2012 (BGH, judgment of 27.04.2012 – V ZR 270 / 10).

In a previous Alert that we published in July 2012 entitled “Michigan Court Authorizes Receiver Sale of Real Property Free and Clear of Redemption Rights,” we reported on a decision of a Michigan trial court in Ottawa County, Michigan permitting a state-court receiver to sell real property free and clear of a mortgagor’s redemption rights.

In a fairly controversial decision from January 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois held that a financing statement must contain the “legal” name of an individual as it appears on the individual’s birth certificate. Miller v. State Bank of Arthur (In re Miller), Adv. P. No. 11-9055 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed and held that the Uniform Commercial Code requires only that a “correct” name appear on the financing statement.

Indiana Code Section 32-28-3-9, often referred to as the Personal Liability Notice (PLN) Statute, provides a means for subcontractors, equipment lessors, and laborers to assert a claim against a project owner for amounts owed for labor and material on a construction project. Essentially, the PLN Statute provides a means to assert a lien against funds the owner would otherwise pay to a general contractor, as contrasted to asserting a mechanic’s lien claim against real estate.

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently held in a published opinion that the appointment of a receiver for the benefit of a mortgagee who agreed to subordinate its mortgages was mandatory under Indiana law. PNC Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. LA Dev., Inc., __ N.W.2d __, 2012 WL 3156539 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012).

Like the common law of most other states, Michigan law generally grants to a court-appointed receiver a first priority claim in the receivership proceeding for payment of the receiver’s fees and expenses incurred in that proceeding. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Henry Smith Floral Co., 260 Mich. 299, 244 N.W. 480 (1932); Cohen v. Cohen, 125 Mich. App. 206, 335 N.W.2d 661 (1983).

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan recently held in a published opinion that no statutory or common law landlord’s lien exists under Michigan law. Rather, in order for a landlord to assert a valid lien on the personal property of its tenant, the tenant must have consensually agreed to grant a security interest in the property and the landlord must have perfected such interest in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In re Kentwood Pharmacy, LLC, ___ B.R. ___, 2012 WL 2899383 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. July 17, 2012).

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the rejection of a trademark license by the trustee did not abrogate the licensee’s rights under a prepetition agreement to use the debtor’s trademark. Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, __F.3d __, 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012). The Seventh Circuit decision is contrary to a prior decision by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).

Now everything will be better! The new ESUG legislation which entered into force on 1 March 2012 has generated huge expectations. The somewhat unwieldy title of “Law for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Businesses” covers a raft of significant changes to the Insolvency Act and existing restructuring regulations. Its objectives are ambitious. The ESUG is intended to make business restructuring easier, more effective and faster – thus a press release from the Federal Ministry of Justice dated 23 February 2012.