The qualification of a right as a 'right in rem' (zakelijk recht), within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (the "Regulation") must be determined according to the law of the place where the asset concerned is situated and the right in rem must satisfy certain criteria set out in Article 5(2) of the Regulation.

On 29 March 2017, Advocate General Mengozzi rendered his opinion to the EU Court of Justice in the landmark case regarding the Estro pre-packed bankruptcy.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).

Op 20 december 2016 is het wetsvoorstel versterking positie curator door de Tweede Kamer aangenomen. Ook dit wetsvoorstel maakt onderdeel uit van het overkoepelende Wetgevingsprogramma Herijking Faillissementsrecht.

Het wetsvoorstel Wet continuïteit ondernemingen I maakt onderdeel uit van het overkoepelende Wetgevingsprogramma Herijking Faillissementsrecht waarin wijzigingen van het faillissementsrecht worden voorbereid.

In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that both the debtor and any counterparty performing the legal act have knowledge of prejudice to creditors if, at the time of performing the legal act, the bankruptcy of the debtor and a shortfall in the bankruptcy estate is foreseeable. This judgment confirms the Supreme Court's decision of 22 December 2009 (ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI8493).

On Jan. 17, 2017, in a closely watched dispute surrounding Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp. (the “Decision”).[1] In a 2-1 ruling reversing the District Court,[2] the Court of Appeals construed Section 316(b) narrowly, holding that it only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and does not protect noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[3]

“Transaction fees are part of the standard, negotiated base compensation for the investment banker,” held the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on Dec. 16, 2016. In re Relativity Fashion, LLC, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4339, *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (Wiles, B.J.). The court denied objections to the transaction fees sought by two investment bankers, P and H, ruling that the objecting parties (a fee examiner, the debtor and a secured lender) had no right under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 328(a) to challenge the transaction fees. Id. at *25.

The District Court of Oost-Brabant: At the time of collection, if a trustee in bankruptcy has collected enforcement proceeds from receivables pledged under an undisclosed right of pledge over receivables, the pledgee of the undisclosed right of pledge remains entitled to claim such proceeds from the trustee in bankruptcy, provided it has not collected the proceeds in its capacity as representative of the insolvent pledgor. The claim, however, only applies to proceeds which have been paid directly into the liquidation account.