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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on Feb. 21, 2014, affirmed the dismissal of a bankruptcy trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint against a “warehouse” lender who had been paid by a distressed home mortgage originator several months prior to the originator’s bankruptcy. Gold v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (2-1). Affirming the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit held that “the bank accepted the payments” from its borrower “in good faith.” Id., at *2.

Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover transfers from creditors that are labeled “preferences.” To avoid a transfer as a preference, the trustee must generally demonstrate that the transfer: (1) was of an interest of the debtor in property, (2) was made to or for the benefit of a creditor, (3) was made on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor, (4) was made while the debtor was insolvent, (5) was made within 90 days before the petition date (within a year if the creditor was an insider) and (6) enabled the creditor to receive more than the c

Although property obtained by a debtor after filing for bankruptcy is usually safe from creditors, a recent case from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel allowed a Chapter 7 Trustee to sell real property obtained by the debtors post-petition.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).

We recently wrote about the highly controversial decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Fisker Automotive capping a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at $25 million.[1] The secured creditor immediately appealed to the District Court.[2] As a procedural matter, the secured creditor had an absolute right to have its appeal heard only if the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling was considered a “final order.” If it was not a “final order,” then the District Court had discretion on whether to hear the merits of the appeal. On Feb.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Jan. 27, 2014 that a lender’s acceleration due to a borrower’s payment default did not trigger a prepayment premium. In re Denver Merchandise Mart, Inc., 2014 WL 291920, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Denver Merchandise”). Affirming the lower courts’ application of state law, the court held that “the plain language of the contract does not require the payment of the Prepayment Consideration in the event of mere acceleration.” Id. at *5.  

Relevance

On Jan. 10, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al., capped a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at only $25 million (the amount it paid to purchase the claim). The decision is on appeal. While the Court stated that its decision is non-precedential, it serves as a cautionary tale for secured lenders who also are potential acquirers of a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy sales.

Facts

Loan to Fisker