In a measured opinion hewing closely to standard principles of contract interpretation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105, slip op. (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2012), rejected the notion that a sovereign may issue bonds governed by New York state law and subject to the jurisdiction of the state’s courts, and then restructure those bonds in a manner that violates New York state law.

Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.

Law Decree No. 83/2012, providing “Urgent Measures for the Country's Development”

Law Decree No. 83 of 22 June 2012 (the “Decree”), effective as from 26 June 2012 and converted into law with amendments1, has introduced important measures aimed at stimulating the Italian economy (also referred to as “Decreto Sviluppo”).

The Decree, consisting of seventy articles, sets forth a heterogeneous set of rules, including, among other provisions, significant amendments to the Italian Bankruptcy Law.2

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.

On June 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Vitro SAB”) declined to recognize and enforce an order issued by the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of León, Mexico, which approved Vitro SAB’s reorganization plan in its Mexican insolvency proceeding (known as a concurso mercantil proceeding). Vitro S.A.B. v. ACP Master Fund, Ltd., et al. (In re Vitro S.A.B.), Case No. 11–33335 (HDH), 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012).

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.  

On May 29, 2012, the Supreme Court in In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC (“RadLAX”) held that a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code.

It is not uncommon for firms to use standard language in their account agreements that creates liens on Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Two recent federal court decisions, however, suggest that granting such a lien on an IRA may constitute a prohibited transaction that causes these accounts to lose their tax exempt status, which in turn could potentially make IRAs subject to third-party creditor claims. These two decisions could have far-reaching implications for any firm that has used or still uses similar lien-creating language in their account agreements.

Taking the lead from its recent decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners,¹ in In re River East Plaza, LLC,² the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor cannot avoid the lien retention prong of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)³ by transferring an undersecured creditor’s lien to substitute collateral as indubitable equivalence pursuant to Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).

最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国企业破产法》若干问题的规定（一）(09/09/2011)