Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.

The Personal Insolvency Bill has now passed through the Dail and will commence in the Seanad. The Minister for Justice has commented that the intention is still to have the Bill enacted by Christmas.

Law Decree No. 83/2012, providing “Urgent Measures for the Country's Development”

Law Decree No. 83 of 22 June 2012 (the “Decree”), effective as from 26 June 2012 and converted into law with amendments1, has introduced important measures aimed at stimulating the Italian economy (also referred to as “Decreto Sviluppo”).

The Decree, consisting of seventy articles, sets forth a heterogeneous set of rules, including, among other provisions, significant amendments to the Italian Bankruptcy Law.2

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.

On 4 July 2012, the Minister for Finance, Mr Michael Noonan, launched a public consultation on the tax implications of appointing a receiver. The consultation paper was jointly issued by the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners and invited input by 4 September 2012 from interested parties in relation to technical and practical tax implications concerning the appointment of receivers.

The Personal Insolvency Bill 2012 has passed Committee Stage in the Dáil. The Select Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality made a number of changes to the Bill, many of these being technical changes to clarify provisions or to correct inconsistencies.

Key changes

Some of the key changes made by the Select Committee were as follows:

The Irish telecommunications company eircom recently successfully concluded its restructuring through the Irish examinership process. This examinership is both the largest in terms of the overall quantum of debt that was restructured and also the largest successful restructuring through examinership in Ireland to date. The speed with which the restructuring of this strategically important company was concluded was due in large part to the degree of pre-negotiation between the company and its lenders before the process commenced.

The much anticipated Personal Insolvency Bill has been published and introduces wide-ranging measures to seek to deal with the issue of personal debt affecting many people in the country today. The headline changes are the reduction of the period a person is bankrupt from 12 to 3 years and the introduction of three new debt resolution processes which, while being under the jurisdiction of the Courts are predominantly non judicial based processes involving the newly established Insolvency Service.

On June 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Vitro SAB”) declined to recognize and enforce an order issued by the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of León, Mexico, which approved Vitro SAB’s reorganization plan in its Mexican insolvency proceeding (known as a concurso mercantil proceeding). Vitro S.A.B. v. ACP Master Fund, Ltd., et al. (In re Vitro S.A.B.), Case No. 11–33335 (HDH), 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012).

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.