One of the effects of commercial globalization is that the bankruptcy filing of a debtor with transnational business relationships will sometimes result in a clash between the substantive bankruptcy laws of different countries.  A frequent question is whether the bankruptcy laws of a foreign country should be brought to bear upon creditors located in the United States, even where foreign bankruptcy law is at odds with the laws of the United States. 

In a decision that demonstrates the potentially broad impact of the forthcoming Supreme Court decision in Bellingham, the Fifth Circuit held that bankruptcy judges may not “determine” non-core matters even where the parties consent. BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), No. 12-51270 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2013), see Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2880 (2013) (set for oral argument January 14, 2014).

Adding to the split of authority that has developed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 12-1349 (Aug. 21, 2013), the 7th Circuit aligned with the 6th Circuit’s decision in Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012), to hold that a party may not consent or waive objection to the limited Constitutional authority of an Article I bankruptcy court.

The Supreme Court may revisit two of the many questions left open by its much-discussed decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), an opinion famous not only for its subject – the estate of the late actress and model Anna Nicole Smith – but also for redefining the allocation of judicial authority between an Article III federal district court and a bankruptcy court. Appellants have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.

To deepen government reform and improve government efficiency, the State Council of the People's Republic of China recently released the Plans for Government Institutional Reform and Function Change (the Restructuring Plan), and was approved by People’s Congress at its first session and it took effect on March 14, 2013.

A recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York¹ found that a UCC-3 termination statement filed on behalf of a secured creditor was not effective because it lacked the proper authorization.

In In the Matter of Castleton Plaza, LP,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a new value plan that leaves creditor claims unpaid must be subjected to a market test if the new value is contributed by an insider. The decision by the Seventh Circuit expanded the competition requirement to insiders whether or not the insider is a holder of a claim or interest against the debtor.

International structures as used by multinational companies typically could include limited partnerships or general partnerships. If the Netherlands is involved in these international structures, these partnerships may be set up in such a way that they qualify as transparent for Dutch tax purposes. Further, partnerships could be used to manage the recognition of taxable income (for example, the so called CV‐BV structures). ThisGT Alert may be helpful in further managing and controlling the tax risks within such structures.

Rejecting the formalistic approach, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in Indianapolis Downs, LLC¹ focused on the policies underlying the idea of the disclosure statement to uphold a post-petition lock-up agreement, entered into before approval of a disclosure statement, with sophisticated financial players who had access to the material information that the disclosure statement would have provided.

In a measured opinion hewing closely to standard principles of contract interpretation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105, slip op. (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2012), rejected the notion that a sovereign may issue bonds governed by New York state law and subject to the jurisdiction of the state’s courts, and then restructure those bonds in a manner that violates New York state law.