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Claims trading has become increasingly commonplace in today’s bankruptcy cases, typically with little need for policing by the courts.

In December 2017, Congress passed and President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Job Act of 2017 (TCJA). Effective as of Jan. 1, 2018, the TCJA is a wide-ranging change to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Tax Code) affecting individual, corporate, and international taxation.

Lost amongst the many commentaries are two changes that have a negative impact on business debtors under the Bankruptcy Code: (1) reduction of the corporate tax rates and (2) elimination of the ability to carry back net operating losses.

Secured Creditor’s Priority Over Unremitted GST/HST: SCC Grants Callidus Capital Corporation Leave to Appeal

On March 22, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada granted Callidus Capital Corporation (the “Secured Creditor”) leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal decision that interpreted subsection 222(3) of the Excise Tax Act (Canada) (the “ETA”) as giving the Crown super priority to property received by a secured creditor from a tax debtor before bankruptcy.

On March 22, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada granted Callidus Capital Corporation (the “Secured Creditor”) leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal decision that interpreted subsection 222(3) of the Excise Tax Act (Canada) (the “ETA”) as giving the Crown super priority to property received by a secured creditor from a tax debtor before bankruptcy.

Le 22 mars 2018, la Cour suprême du Canada a accordé à Callidus Capital Corporation (le « créancier garanti ») l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de la décision de la Cour d’appel fédérale dont l’interprétation du paragraphe 222(3) de la Loi sur la taxe daccise (Canada) (la « LTA ») donne à la Couronne la priorité absolue sur les biens reçus par un créancier garanti d’un débiteur fiscal avant la faillite.

Earlier this year, we wrote here about the decision in I.D.H. Diamonds NV v Embee Diamond Technologies Inc., 2017 SKQB 79, where Mr. Justice Layh held:

Historically, German insolvencies have been perceived as extremely unattractive, particularly because they were dominated by court-appointed bankruptcy administrators, with limited to no influence for creditors. This has, however, significantly changed over the last years. In that respect, it was the clearly expressed intention of the German legislature to make insolvencies more attractive for all parties involved. However, the available powerful features are often still unknown and hence not used, in particular by foreign investors.