Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

The issue of how causation can be established has been one significant debate in Australian securities class actions involving alleged breaches of the Corporations Act by corporations. It has been unresolved whether shareholders must prove individual reliance on the contravening conduct of companies, or if the conduct affects the market price of shares purchased and/or sold by shareholders is sufficient.

You know, there’s never a dull moment when one reports on the regulatory states’ endless and so often fruitless and wrong-headed tinkering with the global economy. So now… let’s talk bail-in.

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation,¹ represents a significant victory for shareholders who may get cashed out in connection with a leveraged transaction that precedes a company bankruptcy.

SEC and FDIC Propose Dodd-Frank Broker-Dealer Resolution Rules

Section 440D imposes a stay on “proceedings in a court” against a company whilst it is in administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. It is well established that the term “proceedings in a court” does not include an arbitration proceeding: see Larkden Pty Limited v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 1305 at [42] (Hammerschlag J). Notwithstanding this, can the Court use its general power to make orders under s447A to extend the reach of s440D in order to impose a stay on an arbitration against a company in administration?

Two recent court decisions may affect an equity sponsor’s options when deciding whether and how to put money into - or take money out of - a portfolio company. The first may expand the scope of “inequitable conduct” that, in certain Chapter 11 settings, could lead a court to equitably subordinate a loan made by a sponsor to its portfolio company, placing the loan behind all of the company’s other debt in the payment queue. The second decision muddies the waters of precedent under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on the issue of the avoidability of non-U.S.

An overvalued property may now have a bigger impact on a secured creditor’s bottom-line during bankruptcy.  Splitting with the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Southwest Securities, FSB v.

Two recent court decisions may result in a broadening of the range of options available to an equity sponsor in respect of an insolvent portfolio company. The first decision may provide increased flexibility in structuring asset sales in certain chapter 11 settings, by utilizing escrows and other techniques to potentially avoid the need to apply asset-sale proceeds strictly in accordance with creditor priorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

The recent Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia decision of Templeton v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 has considered the application of 'proportionality' in determining receivers' remuneration.