The application of sovereign immunity principles in bankruptcy cases has vexed the courts for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter have not helped much. Although they have addressed the issue in specific contexts, they have not established clear guidelines that the lower courts may apply more generally. The Third Circuit took a crack at clarifying this muddy but important area of the law in the case of Venoco LLC (with its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”).
Background
The last 12 months has seen a number of court applications being made for extensions of time to register a security interest under s293 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA) and/or s588FM of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), to avoid collateral vesting in the grantor upon an insolvency event.
On 10 May 2021 in Badenoch Integrated Logging Pty Ltd v Bryant, in the matter of Gunns Limited (in liq)(receivers and managers apptd)[i] the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia abolished the application of the Peak Indebtedness Rule to a running account ‘single transaction’ under section 588FA(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) in unfair p
In Bechara v Bates,[1] the Full Federal Court reminds us of the proper procedure for review of a sequestration order made by a registrar. This case raises an important point about bankruptcy practice and procedure in the Federal Circuit Court and the Federal Court.
In Ross, in the matter of Print Mail Logistics (International) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Elias,[1] the Federal Court considered the extent to which a Jones v Dunkel[2] inference can be made.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).
Background
Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.
Background
In a first, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the Arcapita Bank case had to decide whether Shari’a compliant investment agreements, providing for Murabaha and Wakala transactions, qualify for the safe harbor protections provided in the bankruptcy code for securities contracts, forwards and swaps. The court held that they do not. Since the opinion runs about 100 pages long, we attempt to distill some very basic facts concerning Shari’a compliant transactions and point to important holdings made by the court.
Shari’a Compliant Transactions
In ACN 004 410 833 Ltd (formerly Arrium Limited) (in liq) v Michael Thomas Walton & anor,[1] the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the purpose for which public examination summons and production of documents can be ordered.
In Re Octaviar Ltd,[1] the Supreme Court of Queensland has given a recent example of a settlement considered too ‘good’ to approve, even while noting its failure to achieve perfection.