Fulltext Search

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey denied motions to dismiss the chapter 11 case of the newly created subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, LTL Management LLC, and granted the debtor’s motion to stay prosecution of actions asserting talc related personal injuries against its J&J affiliates and the products distributors. This is the first opinion outside the North Carolina bankruptcy court approving the use of the so-called Texas Two Step as a bankruptcy execution strategy.

The Motions to Dismiss

Foreign companies seeking to protect their overseas assets from their creditors have often turned to the United States for immediate relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Establishing jurisdiction in the US for purposes of a bankruptcy filing has proved easy – the establishment of a nominal professional fees retainer with a local law firm on the eve of a bankruptcy filing will suffice.

Earlier this year, Mexican airline, Grupo Aeromexico, S.A.B. de C.V. (together with its affiliates, the “Debtors”) announced that their creditor body had overwhelmingly voted to approve their proposed Chapter 11 restructuring plan (the “Plan”) save for one class of unsecured creditor claims that voted to reject the Plan. Those claims were held by Invictus Global Management, LLC (“Invictus”), a distressed investment fund that recently purchased the claims subject to a “plan support provision” which purportedly compelled the claimholder to support the Debtors’ Plan.

The merchant cash advance (“MCA”) industry recently provided two different bankruptcy courts with an opportunity to consider the characterization of MCA funding transactions as either “true sales” of receivables or “disguised loans”.

The practice of granting third party releases in bankruptcy was recently dealt another blow by the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In Patterson et. al. v. Mahwah Bergen Retail Group, Inc., Civil No. 3:21cv167 (DJN), the District Court found that the lower bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to both rule on certain of the claims covered by the third-party releases at issue and, it follows, to confirm the debtors’ plan of reorganization.

On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company. 

Background 

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently expressed its view regarding the reach of the “solvent debtor exception” in In re The Hertz Corp., et al. The solvent debtor exception is an equitable doctrine which supports the proposition that creditors are entitled to the full suite of their contractual rights if the debtor in bankruptcy is solvent.

On the 19th of August 2021, the English High Court sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (“Amicus”) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the “Restructuring Plan”).

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia with relatively few variations, sets out, among other things, the rules to be followed when obtaining a security interest in personal property collateral to secure a loan. The basic premise of Article 9 is that if the lender follows the rules, it should be protected against third parties, including other creditors or a bankruptcy trustee, who would seek to challenge the lender’s security interest or the priority of the security interest.

In its much-discussed decision, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2020), the Supreme Court ruled that the City of Chicago (“City”) was not in violation of Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code for failing to release an impounded car to a debtor in bankruptcy.