On May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, so long as parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, a bankruptcy court can issue final orders on matters that it otherwise would not have the constitutional authority to decide. In Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif,¹ a highly anticipated decision, the majority of the Supreme Court delivered a pragmatic opinion that quelled fears stemming from the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.

Recently, Corinthian Colleges, Inc., one of the United States' largest for-profit educational conglomerations with 72,000 students across 107 campuses, filed (along with 25 affiliated subsidiaries) a chapter 11 voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection. Corinthian reported $19.2 million of total assets and US$143.1 million of total debts, and plans to liquidate.

What happens when a debtor, whose loan is pooled and securitized, files for bankruptcy? Are payments made to investors recoverable as fraudulent transfers or preferences?

In what appears to be a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that payments made to investors in a two tiered securitization structure commonly employed in commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”) transactions are largely protected from fraudulent or preferential transfer claims by the securities contract safe harbor set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v.

When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.

We have previously reported that the Official Receiver retains its entitlement to ad valorem fees on the conversion of a compulsory liquidation  to a creditors’ voluntary winding-up (CVL).

Recent legal and regulatory developments have raised issues for those considering a loan-to-own acquisition strategy, and have continued to impact both the structure of highly leveraged financings and the makeup of those willing to provide it.

In re RML  --  Irrational Exuberance?

Insider status in U.S. bankruptcy carries with it significant burdens. Insiders face a one year preference exposure rather than the 90 day period applicable to non-insiders; insiders are by definition disinterested persons and may not be retained to provide professional services and transactions among debtors and their insiders are subject to heightened scrutiny under the entire fairness doctrine.

Several recent legal and regulatory developments in the U.S. will likely alter the makeup of the group of arrangers and financiers willing to arrange and provide financing for certain highly leveraged transactions, and also provide guidance to those considering a loan-to-own or related acquisition strategy, in order to help avoid potential pitfalls. 

Revised Leveraged Lending Guidance

On a recent Mayer Brown JSM application (on behalf  of the Liquidators of one of the Lehman Brothers  entities) to reduce and expunge proofs of debt, the  Hong Kong High Court has ruled that creditors who  receive an overpayment of dividends due in respect of  a proof of debt which has been “improperly  admitted” (rule 96, Companies Winding-Up Rules)  must give credit for those overpayments before  receiving further dividends in the liquidation (Re  Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp Asia Ltd (“LBCCA”) [2014] HKEC 849) (“Proof Appl