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When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.

Recent legal and regulatory developments have raised issues for those considering a loan-to-own acquisition strategy, and have continued to impact both the structure of highly leveraged financings and the makeup of those willing to provide it.

In re RML  --  Irrational Exuberance?

Insider status in U.S. bankruptcy carries with it significant burdens. Insiders face a one year preference exposure rather than the 90 day period applicable to non-insiders; insiders are by definition disinterested persons and may not be retained to provide professional services and transactions among debtors and their insiders are subject to heightened scrutiny under the entire fairness doctrine.

Several recent legal and regulatory developments in the U.S. will likely alter the makeup of the group of arrangers and financiers willing to arrange and provide financing for certain highly leveraged transactions, and also provide guidance to those considering a loan-to-own or related acquisition strategy, in order to help avoid potential pitfalls. 

Revised Leveraged Lending Guidance

The recent case of APCOA Parking1 has set a precedent by allowing yet more non-English incorporated debtors to implement financial and corporate restructurings using English schemes of arrangement.

As is well known, the right to credit bid is the entitlement of a secured lender to bid the amount of its outstanding claims at the sale of its collateral. If the secured lender places the winning bid, no money is exchanged and the purchase price is offset against the existing claims. Credit bidding provides an important right to secured lenders in ensuring that their collateral is not sold for a depressed value. If a secured lender thinks its collateral is being sold too cheaply, it has the option of taking the collateral in exchange for some or all its claims.

The Financial Crisis, a difficult market situation and a tense liquidity status have led to remarkable difficulties for mid-sized businesses within the past years. Strategic and financial investors have and continue to utilize these circumstances to acquire interesting distressed companies for comparatively moderate purchase prices.

In order to benefit from these circumstances, investors need to understand how to avoid or minimize the risks of liability related to such acquisitions.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code limits the ability of a trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid as a constructive fraudulent transfer or preferential transfer a transaction in which the challenged settlement payment was made through a stockbroker or a financial institution.1 Because of the broad protection granted by section 546(e) – the so-called “safe harbor” provision – parties structuring a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) or similar transaction often ensure that settlement funds flow through one of the listed institutions to inoculate the beneficiaries from a later challenge as a constr