The U.S. Supreme Court held that a secured creditor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case is protected from having its lien “stripped off” even if the collateral securing its claim is worth less than the claims asserted by a senior secured creditor; i.e.the junior creditor’s secured claim is completely "out of the money.” The June 1, 2015 decision, Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding in Dewsnup v.
This week’s unanimous Supreme Court decision barring the strip off of wholly unsecured junior liens in chapter 7 cases is one of the stranger recent opinions of the Court. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, ___ U.S. ___ (June 1, 2015). While the result is not particularly surprising, what is unusual is that the Court goes out of its way to question its two decades old decision inDewsnup and may even be hinting that it is ready to overrule that decision. See Dewsnup v. Timm,502 U.S. 410 (1992).
A collective sigh of relief was the main effect of this week’s much-awaited Supreme Court decision on bankruptcy jurisdiction in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, ___ U.S.___ (May 26, 2015, Sotomayor, J.). While a number of minor issues remain, the majority’s ruling that bankruptcy judges can issue judgments and final orders with the parties’ consent means that the current bankruptcy system can continue to function normally.
On May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, so long as parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, a bankruptcy court can issue final orders on matters that it otherwise would not have the constitutional authority to decide. In Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif,1 a highly anticipated decision, the majority of the Supreme Court delivered a pragmatic opinion that quelled fears stemming from the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.
Recently, Corinthian Colleges, Inc., one of the United States' largest for-profit educational conglomerations with 72,000 students across 107 campuses, filed (along with 25 affiliated subsidiaries) a chapter 11 voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection. Corinthian reported $19.2 million of total assets and US$143.1 million of total debts, and plans to liquidate.
What happens when a debtor, whose loan is pooled and securitized, files for bankruptcy? Are payments made to investors recoverable as fraudulent transfers or preferences?
In what appears to be a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that payments made to investors in a two tiered securitization structure commonly employed in commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”) transactions are largely protected from fraudulent or preferential transfer claims by the securities contract safe harbor set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v.
When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.
In a little-noticed November opinion, the Seventh Circuit greatly expanded the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a security interest for documentation errors under section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. See State Bank of Toulon v. Covey (In re Duckworth), 776 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2014).
Recent legal and regulatory developments have raised issues for those considering a loan-to-own acquisition strategy, and have continued to impact both the structure of highly leveraged financings and the makeup of those willing to provide it.
In re RML -- Irrational Exuberance?