Overview

A recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Texas concludes that directors of a non-debtor general partner may owe fiduciary duties to a limited partnership debtor in bankruptcy whether or not such duties exist (or have been disclaimed) under the debtor's and general partner's organizational documents or applicable state law.[1]  In deciding whether to dismiss an involuntary petition filed against Houston Regional Sports Network, L.P.

Given the commonality in today’s marketplace of complex corporate capital structures that employ multiple layers of secured debt, existing and potential creditors need to be increasingly aware of the rights and limitations provided for in subordination or intercreditor agreements. These agreements are often entered into between the existing lender or debt holder and a new lender. They often restrict the actions of subordinated lenders upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy protection, including denying their right to vote on the debtor’s plan of reorganization.

In a recent decision¹, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found the standard for sealing under § 107 of the Bankruptcy Code was not met and declined to seal a settlement agreement, despite requests from the Chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee") and the counterparties to the settlement agreement to do so. Confidentiality was an essential condition of the settlement. In addition, the United States trustee supported the motion to seal, arguing that the standard for sealing had been met.

Congress enacted the ordinary course of business defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to protect recurring, customary transactions in order to encourage the continuation of business with and the extension of credit to a financially distressed customer.

Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) litigations have sometimes yield "shocking results". There is no pun intended here. This article discusses a recent case where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana waded into the spine tingling issue of whether electricity is a good that is subject to Section 503(b)(9) administrative priority status.

Large businesses and organizations that self-insure their legally mandated insurance requirements often use “fronting” policies in which the policyholder must reimburse insurers for all losses and expenses paid on the policyholder’s behalf. These policyholders must furnish substantial collateral to secure repayment, typically, enough to pay many years’ worth of actual and anticipated claims. This can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, and typically exacerbates cash flow and balance sheet problems for policyholders under financial stress.

In two recent decisions,² the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions by large chapter 11 debtors to approve executive bonus plans designated as key employee incentive plans ("KEIP"), finding that the proposed KEIPs actually were disguised and impermissible retention or "pay to stay" bonus plans for insiders. These are the first opinions to reject so-called KEIPs following a recent line of cases that have approved KEIPs for insiders.

On August 2, 2012, in the case ofIn re MBS Management Services, Inc.,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a retail electricity agreement with a real estate management company constituted a forward contract protected by the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).