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Significant emerging factors and trends are increasing pressure on directors. After several years of relative stasis induced by the pandemic (when many businesses were supported by various government initiatives and bank flexibility, whilst also enjoying ATO and creditor patience), there is a distinct whiff of change in the air. This year, we might see a move back to a more ‘normal’, pre-COVID setting. If so, there will be pressures for some, and opportunity for others.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that because Indian tribes are indisputably governments, the Bankruptcy Code unmistakably abrogates their sovereign immunity to bankruptcy court proceedings.

In an environment of interest rate pressure, a cooling economy and global economic uncertainty, corporate insolvencies are a stark reality. The failure of construction companies has become regular news and ASIC recently released insolvency data that shows a marked uptick in Australian insolvencies in general.

The introduction of the ‘ipso facto regime’ in 2018 had a widespread impact on the drafting and application of termination provisions in commercial contracts, casting doubt on the longstanding practice of allowing a right to terminate a contract when another party to the contract becomes insolvent.

On January 23, the NY DFS released updated guidance with regard to better protecting consumers in the event of virtual currency insolvency. This updated guidance applies to entities that DFS has licensed or chartered to hold or maintain virtual currency assets on behalf of their customers.

Recreational cannabis is now legal in 19 states and Washington D.C., driving the growth of legal cannabis sales estimated at $33 billion this year—up 32% from 2021—and expected to reach $52 billion by 2026.[1] This movement signals that financial investment in cannabis is not abating but accelerating notwithstanding the impact of the lingering COVID-19 pandemic.

As of November 1, 2021, dealers in security-based swaps (“SBS”) whose dealing activity exceeds certain de minimis thresholds (e.g., gross notional amount of $3 billion for credit default SBS, $150 million for other SBS, and $25 million for SBS where the counterparty is a special entity) are required to register with the SEC as a security-based swap dealer (“SBSD”) and to comply with the SEC’s regulations applicable to SBS.

Most restructuring professionals will tell you that there is no “typical” restructuring. That is absolutely true. Every financially distressed business is different and the character and direction of its restructuring will be highly dependent upon, among others, its capital structure, its liquidity profile, and the level of support it can build for its reorganization among key stakeholder bodies. Nevertheless, there are some important similarities in the way that any company should initially address a distressed situation.

This past Monday, July 26, marked passage of the most recent major milestone in the replacement of LIBOR as the benchmark USD interest rate. Following the recommendation of the CFTC’s Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC) Interest Rate Benchmark Reform Subcommittee, on July 26, 2021 interdealer brokers replaced trading in LIBOR linear swaps with SOFR linear swaps. This switch is a precursor to the recommendation of SOFR term rates. The switch does not apply to trades between dealers and their non-dealer customers.