In RGH Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2011 WL 2471542 (N.Y.
On Thursday, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled in Stern v. Marshall[1] that the congressional grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on counterclaims to proofs of claim was unconstitutional. For the litigants, this decision brought an end to an expensive and drawn out litigation between the estates of former Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband, Pierce Marshall, which Justice Roberts writing for the majority analogized to the fictional litigation in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House.
In In re Young Broadcasting, Inc., et al., 430 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), a bankruptcy court strictly construed the change-in-control provisions of a pre-petition credit agreement and refused to confirm an unsecured creditors' committee's plan of reorganization, which had been premised on the reinstatement of the debtors' accelerated secured debt under Section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On February 11, 2011, the Hon Alan Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a 113 page opinion and order quashing the bankruptcy court's order requiring the lenders involved in TOUSA, Inc.'s Transeastern joint venture to disgorge, as fraudulent transfers under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, settlement monies that they had received on July 31, 2007 in repayment of their existing debt and to pay prejudgment interest on such monies, for a total disgorgement in excess of $480 million.
1 Loranger v Jones, 184 Cal App 4th 847 (3d Dist May 2010)
Jones, a licensed contractor, had a workers' compensation policy covering his employees. Jones unknowingly used an unlicensed subcontractor and knowingly permitted two minors without work permits, and another person without a contractor's license, to help perform work for Loranger. Loranger refused to pay the final invoice and Jones filed suit for breach of contract. Loranger cross-complained alleging defects and sought disgorgement of monies paid.
A decision out of the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina (the “District Court”), now being appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, highlights just how critical it is for lenders to strictly comply with local recording requirements when recording their liens. In SunTrust Bank N.A. v. Northen, 433 B.R. 532 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
On October 21, 2010, the Ninth Circuit overruled what many thought to be well-settled law, and held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have standing to pursue alter ego claims, at least in cases governed by California law. The court first held that California state law does not recognize a general alter-ego cause of action that allows an entity and its equity holders to be treated as alter egos for purposes of all of the entity’s debts.
In a partial reversal of a decision from Bayou Group LLC's bankruptcy case, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York reconsidered a controversial ruling that sent shivers down the spines of institutional investors in 2008. See In re Bayou Group , LLC, No. 09 Civ. 02577 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2010).
In a decision that may create a significant roadblock for companies saddled with environmental clean-up liability to continue as a going concern, the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009) affirmed a district court injunction requiring the clean-up of a contaminated site in Illinois under section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) despite the company's bankruptcy. On September 27, 2010, the Supreme Court is scheduled to discuss whether to grant review of the Apex decision.
The California Court of Appeal recently rejected the argument that directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the company's creditors when the company is in the so-called "zone of insolvency," or is even clearly insolvent. In Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. John Boyle, et al., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. Oct. 29, 2009), the California court expounded that "there is no broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty that directors of an insolvent corporation owe the corporation's creditors solely because of a state of insolvency." Id. at 893-94.