In a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Western Real Estate Equities, LLC v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., No. 12-10271 (5th Cir. 2013), the court held that the acceptance vote from a minimally and “artificially impaired” class of claims meets the 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) requirement for the confirmation of a non-consensual “cramdown” chapter 11 plan.

In a recent decision, In re Castleton Plaza, LP, 2013 WL 537269 *1 (Feb. 14, 2013), the Seventh Circuit held that the absolute priority rule – which requires that creditors be paid in full before equity holders receive anything on account of their equity interests under a plan of reorganization – applies equally to the “insiders” of a debtor.

Over the last several years, the number of Chapter 15 filings has continued to grow. One of the most prominent of these bankruptcy filings is the Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. case. When last we reported on theVitro case, the Texas bankruptcy court administering the Chapter 15 case had denied recognition to the Mexican restructuring plan of Vitro because the plan provided third party releases to non-debtors. See Vitro, S.A.B.: Bankruptcy Court Refuses to Recognize Mexican Concurso That Releases Claims Against Non-Debtors” (November 2012).

Last Fall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in the Charter Communications bankruptcy case which will create additional significant challenges for those seeking to appeal confirmation of plans of reorganization that have been implemented. See 691 F.3d 476. Upon implementation (or “substantial consummation”) of the plan, the Second Circuit presumes that the appeal of such plan is equitably moot. Appellants bear the burden of overcoming that presumption.

When does the selection of a technically correct venue become “unjust”? This was the core question Judge Shelley Chapman was required to grapple with when Patriot Coal and almost 100 of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in New York this past summer. Should it matter that Patriot Coal created the New York subsidiaries, that permitted a New York court filing, about a month prior to the actual bankruptcy filing?

In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of an executory trademark license does not terminate the licensee’s right to use the trademark. The decision creates a circuit-level split that may invite Supreme Court review. However, no final resolution is likely soon. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in December of 2012.

On March 4, 2013, ‘SA’ NYU WA Inc., a tribally chartered corporation wholly owned by the Hualapai Indian Tribe, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the of District of Arizona.

The bankruptcy of the largest U.S. city to file a chapter 9 bankruptcy petition has yielded a decision with serious implications for municipal creditors. Specifically, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California overruled the objections asserted by retired employees of the City of Stockton, California and authorized the City to suspend the retiree’s health benefits during the City’s Chapter 9 case. Ass’n of Retired Employees of the City of Stockton, et al. v. City of Stockton, California (In re City of Stockton), 56 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 250 (Bankr. E.D.

On March 4, 2013, ‘SA’ NYU WA, Inc., a tribally-chartered corporation wholly owned by the Hualapai Indian Tribe, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona. This is a very important case for tribes and any party conducting business with tribes because the petition will raise a question of first impression for the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court will have to decide whether a tribal corporation is eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

In Greb v. Diamond Int’l Corp., 2013 WL 628328 (Cal. Feb. 21, 2013), the California Supreme Court unequivocally and unanimously laid to rest the assertion that dissolved foreign corporations may be sued in California after the time of the statute of limitations provided by the laws under which the foreign corporations were incorporated.