On February 11, 2011, the Hon Alan Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a 113 page opinion and order quashing the bankruptcy court's order requiring the lenders involved in TOUSA, Inc.'s Transeastern joint venture to disgorge, as fraudulent transfers under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, settlement monies that they had received on July 31, 2007 in repayment of their existing debt and to pay prejudgment interest on such monies, for a total disgorgement in excess of $480 million.
The short answer to the title question is “no.” However, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has limited “back-up” authority to place into liquidation an insurance company that (i) meets certain criteria as respects the nature of its business and (ii) is essentially “too big to fail.” This liquidation proceeding would, however, still be under the relevant state insurance liquidation laws.1
1 Loranger v Jones, 184 Cal App 4th 847 (3d Dist May 2010)
Jones, a licensed contractor, had a workers' compensation policy covering his employees. Jones unknowingly used an unlicensed subcontractor and knowingly permitted two minors without work permits, and another person without a contractor's license, to help perform work for Loranger. Loranger refused to pay the final invoice and Jones filed suit for breach of contract. Loranger cross-complained alleging defects and sought disgorgement of monies paid.
In a second decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida involving secured lenders to bankrupt homebuilder TOUSA, Inc., on March 4, 2011, Judge Adalberto Jordan affirmed the dismissal of fraudulent conveyance claims brought against the lenders on a revolving credit facility. In dismissing those claims, the Bankruptcy Court had emphasized that, because the revolving credit agreement was entered into, and the liens securing it were pledged, well before the company's alleged insolvency, they were immune from fraudulent conveyance attack.
On February 11, 2011, the Hon. Alan Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reversed the October 30, 2009 fraudulent conveyance finding issued by the Bankruptcy Court in the TOUSA case as it pertained to lenders involved in TOUSA’s Transeastern joint venture.
A decision out of the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina (the “District Court”), now being appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, highlights just how critical it is for lenders to strictly comply with local recording requirements when recording their liens. In SunTrust Bank N.A. v. Northen, 433 B.R. 532 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
On August 28, 2010, Compañía Mexicana de Aviación (“Mexicana”), the third oldest airline in the world and one of the most important airlines in Latin America, stopped flying.
Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that if a secured creditor receives “adequate protection” for its interest in collateral held by a debtor, but that adequate protection ultimately proves insufficient, then the creditor is entitled to a “superpriority” administrative expense claim sufficient to cover any uncompensated diminution in the value of that collateral.
In Bank of America, N.A. v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Case No. 08-01753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010), the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York was called on to decide whether Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) effectuated an improper setoff of $500 million shortly after Lehman Brother Holdings Inc. (“Lehman” or “LBHI”) filed its petition on September 15, 2008 (the “Petition Date”), and whether the setoff violated the automatic stay.
In a recent opinion, JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overruled its prior decision in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), which adopted the accrual test, a standard for determining the existence of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.