In a widely followed dispute, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will soon render a decision on the appeal of a Texas Bankruptcy Court’s refusal to recognize non-debtor third party releases in the Mexican reorganization proceeding (concurso mercantil) of Mexican glass manufacturer Vitro SAB de CV. Wall Street and the capital markets will be watching this appeal closely as a reversal of the Bankruptcy Court would likely make lenders and bondholders extremely nervous about extending future credit to Mexican corporations.
In a previous Alert that we published in July 2012 entitled “Michigan Court Authorizes Receiver Sale of Real Property Free and Clear of Redemption Rights,” we reported on a decision of a Michigan trial court in Ottawa County, Michigan permitting a state-court receiver to sell real property free and clear of a mortgagor’s redemption rights.
In a fairly controversial decision from January 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois held that a financing statement must contain the “legal” name of an individual as it appears on the individual’s birth certificate. Miller v. State Bank of Arthur (In re Miller), Adv. P. No. 11-9055 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed and held that the Uniform Commercial Code requires only that a “correct” name appear on the financing statement.
Indiana Code Section 32-28-3-9, often referred to as the Personal Liability Notice (PLN) Statute, provides a means for subcontractors, equipment lessors, and laborers to assert a claim against a project owner for amounts owed for labor and material on a construction project. Essentially, the PLN Statute provides a means to assert a lien against funds the owner would otherwise pay to a general contractor, as contrasted to asserting a mechanic’s lien claim against real estate.
The Indiana Court of Appeals recently held in a published opinion that the appointment of a receiver for the benefit of a mortgagee who agreed to subordinate its mortgages was mandatory under Indiana law. PNC Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. LA Dev., Inc., __ N.W.2d __, 2012 WL 3156539 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012).
In Deephaven Distressed Opportunities Tradings, Ltd. v. 3V Capital Master Fund Ltd., Index No. 600610/08 (Sup. Ct., NY County, Jun. 26, 2012), Judge Melvin L. Schweitzer denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on its damages claims. The case arose from a dispute over the trade of distressed claims in the Sea Container, Inc. bankruptcy. Deephaven and 3V Capital executed trade confirmations that would convey “allowed” claims to 3V Capital subject to a negotiated assignment agreement. The parties signed confirmations on three trades, two of which led to this dispute.
Like the common law of most other states, Michigan law generally grants to a court-appointed receiver a first priority claim in the receivership proceeding for payment of the receiver’s fees and expenses incurred in that proceeding. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Henry Smith Floral Co., 260 Mich. 299, 244 N.W. 480 (1932); Cohen v. Cohen, 125 Mich. App. 206, 335 N.W.2d 661 (1983).
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan recently held in a published opinion that no statutory or common law landlord’s lien exists under Michigan law. Rather, in order for a landlord to assert a valid lien on the personal property of its tenant, the tenant must have consensually agreed to grant a security interest in the property and the landlord must have perfected such interest in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In re Kentwood Pharmacy, LLC, ___ B.R. ___, 2012 WL 2899383 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. July 17, 2012).
In Skov v. U.S. Bank N.A., 2102 WL 2549811 (June 8, 2012), the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer against plaintiff Andrea Skov’s second amended complaint, holding that she had stated a claim for violation of Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires a lender to contact a defaulted borrower to discuss alternatives to foreclosure before starting a nonjudicial foreclosure by recording a notice of default.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the rejection of a trademark license by the trustee did not abrogate the licensee’s rights under a prepetition agreement to use the debtor’s trademark. Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, __F.3d __, 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012). The Seventh Circuit decision is contrary to a prior decision by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).