Background
Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) commonly adopt time-based costing for the calculation of their remuneration, primarily on the basis that it ensures that the IP is only remunerated for the work actually undertaken and it ensures that remuneration reflects the simplicity or complexity of particular tasks. Three other ways in which remuneration are common calculated are ‘fixed fee’, ‘percentage’ (such as in respect of recoveries/realisations) and ‘contingency’ bases.
The bar for recovering assets that have been dubiously transferred out of an insolvent company may not be as high as one might think.
Background
On 14 June 2016, in its judgment delivered in Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia confirmed that a benefit transferred from a company without authority can only be retained by the recipient in very limited circumstances.
When the debt owed by a debtor is cancelled or forgiven, the debtor generally has cancellation of indebtedness (COD) income. COD income is generally includable in gross income, but may be excluded under section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code in some instances. A statutory exclusion exists for COD income that arises in a title 11 bankruptcy case or when the taxpayer is insolvent. Final regulations were issued recently that apply these exclusions to a grantor trust or a disregarded entity (DRE).
In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).
The issue of how causation can be established has been one significant debate in Australian securities class actions involving alleged breaches of the Corporations Act by corporations. It has been unresolved whether shareholders must prove individual reliance on the contravening conduct of companies, or if the conduct affects the market price of shares purchased and/or sold by shareholders is sufficient.
The issue of whether gathering agreements are subject to rejection in bankruptcy as executory contracts and whether certain provisions of those agreements run with the land and survive rejection will impact ongoing bankruptcy proceedings of producers, as well as renegotiations of existing gathering agreements.
Section 440D imposes a stay on “proceedings in a court” against a company whilst it is in administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. It is well established that the term “proceedings in a court” does not include an arbitration proceeding: see Larkden Pty Limited v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 1305 at [42] (Hammerschlag J). Notwithstanding this, can the Court use its general power to make orders under s447A to extend the reach of s440D in order to impose a stay on an arbitration against a company in administration?
Both landlords and tenants are well served to begin discussing exclusives early in the lease negotiations.
The recent Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia decision of Templeton v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 has considered the application of 'proportionality' in determining receivers' remuneration.
Update on McCabes' article " 'Are we there yet' - When are proceedings over for the purposes of enforcement"
The High Court of Australia has refused an application for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Sarks v Cassegrain [2015] FCAFC 38, confirming that a judgment issued by the Court on the basis of filing of a certificate of costs assessment is a "final judgment" for the purposes of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and can therefore ground a bankruptcy notice.