On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig located off the coast of Louisiana killed eleven crewmen and set off what is now considered the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history. As a result, BP p.l.c. (“BP”), the parent company of the British Petroleum multinational corporation, faces mounting liabilities related to the damages caused by the disaster and hundreds of lawsuits that have been filed in numerous U.S. state and federal courts.

Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is intended to allow financially stressed debtors to restructure their debt obligations through a plan of reorganization. Typically, a Chapter 11 plan places different types of claims in different classes and, subject to various requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, allows the debtor to pay only portions of the claims (and in certain circumstances not to pay certain claims at all). Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor the flexibility to structure a plan to defer the payment of certain claims.

In a recent decision in the Chapter 11 case of Project Orange Associates, LLC1, the court confronted an important issue that often arises in bankruptcy cases: whether the use of conflicts counsel is sufficient to permit court approval under section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code of a debtor’s choice for general bankruptcy counsel that also represents an important creditor of the debtor in unrelated matters. Here, the conflict involved the debtor's largest unsecured creditor and an essential supplier.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently addressed an objection to the debtor-in-possession financing approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.1 The District Court’s decision, which holds that reversal on appeal of an order approving DIP financing does not invalidate the financing or liens granted by the postpetition lenders, if provided in good faith also addresses both the timeliness of the appeal and the merits of the arguments raised therein, provides a detai

A “roll-up” is a form of postpetition financing which has the effect of elevating the priority of prepetition debt. In a roll-up, the prepetition debt of the postpetition, new money lenders is rolled into the debtor in possession financing, thus affording the prepetition debt superpriority status and, in many circumstances, ensuring the rolled-up debt is paid in full on the effective date of the plan of reorganization, (unless the lender consents to different treatment under the plan).1

Introduction

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the District Court’s ruling in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.1 The Court allowed Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC to require all-cash bids for the asset sale under their proposed plan. This precluded secured creditors from credit bidding, as long as the plan provided those creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of their claims.

The comprehensive financial reform bill recently passed by the Senate1 creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) that would allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company2 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.

In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York distinguished excusable neglect in filing a claim before the expiration of a clear bar date. In a written opinion issued on May 20, 2010 in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., et. al, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), Judge Peck denied seven motions for leave to file late claims finding none satisfied the Second Circuit’s strict standard to find excusable neglect.