The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.
The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.
The facts
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.1 See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).
The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.
This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.
On May 14, 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., et al., No. 11-1889 (3d Cir. May 14, 2012) clarified the burden of proof with respect to the valuation and ultimate allowance of alleged secured claims under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a).
In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.
BESTrustees v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander [2012] EWHC 629 (Ch) (High Court Chancery Division 16 March 2012)
Background
It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.
We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.
The EU insolvency law has resulted in insolvent debtors shopping for a better jurisdiction in which to become bankrupt. This article examines why and how.
Why?
The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 (the ECIR), came into effect in May 2002, providing a framework for the national jurisdictions to work together by recognition of each states insolvency mechanisms. However the EC Regulation does not harmonise substantive differences in insolvency law between the subscribing nations.
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).
Case Background