A problem frequently faced by landlords in the current economic climate is that of tenants who time their entry into administration so that it takes place just after rent payable in advance on a quarter day has fallen due. This growing practice has left landlords frustrated and out of pocket.
Under Section 436 of the Internal Revenue Code, a single employer defined benefit plan sponsored by a company in bankruptcy cannot pay any “prohibited payments” (e.g., lump sums, Social Security level income annuity payments) if the plan is less than 100% funded. In June 2012, the IRS issued proposed regulations permitting such a defined benefit plan to be amended to eliminate prohibited payment forms without violating the anti-cutback requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 411(d)(6) if certain conditions are satisfied.
In our last issue, we looked at the implications for out-of-court administrations where the company or directors seek to appoint an administrator under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, but then discover that between filing their notice of intention to appoint and their notice of appointment, a winding-up petition has been presented, triggering paragraph 25 of the Schedule. Paragraph 25 prevents the appointment of an administrator under paragraph 22 where there is a pending winding-up petition.
On July 25, 2012, the Third Circuit issued its decision in In re American Capital Equipment LLC and Skinner Engine Co., 688 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2012), becoming the first circuit court to align itself with numerous district courts that have allowed bankruptcy courts to reject a Chapter 11 plan prior to a confirmation hearing.
On July 9, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC (“Sunbeam”). It is a landmark opinion for trademark licensees whose licenses are rejected in bankruptcy by trademark owners.
In Loop 76, LLC, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently held that a bankruptcy court may consider whether a creditor received a third party source of payment (e.g., a guaranty) when determining whether that creditor’s claim is “substantially similar” to other claims for purposes of plan classification under 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.1 See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).
On May 14, 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., et al., No. 11-1889 (3d Cir. May 14, 2012) clarified the burden of proof with respect to the valuation and ultimate allowance of alleged secured claims under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a).
In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).
Case Background