The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, equating a covenant not to sue under a patent with a license, has concluded that a trustee in bankruptcy cannot unilaterally reject the covenant as an executory contract. In re Spansion, Case Nos. 11-3323, -3324 (3rd Cir., Dec. 21, 2012) (Scirica, J.).
Spansion and Apple settled a patent dispute at the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) regarding flash memory products, with Spansion agreeing to dismiss its case and to refrain from filing related actions. In pertinent part, the agreement stated:
Under Section 436 of the Internal Revenue Code, a single employer defined benefit plan sponsored by a company in bankruptcy cannot pay any “prohibited payments” (e.g., lump sums, Social Security level income annuity payments) if the plan is less than 100% funded. In June 2012, the IRS issued proposed regulations permitting such a defined benefit plan to be amended to eliminate prohibited payment forms without violating the anti-cutback requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 411(d)(6) if certain conditions are satisfied.
In a case originating out of bankruptcy court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that a perpetual, royalty free, assignable, transferable, exclusive license granted as part of the sale of the business operations, assets and intellectual property associated with two bread baking brands was an executory contract. Lewis Bros. Bakeries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., Case No. 11-1850 (8th Cir., Aug. 30, 2012) (Bye, J.).
During an American Bar Association (ABA) program on antitrust and health care issues on October 1, 2012, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Deputy Director for Health Care and Antitrust, Leemore Dafny, said that the FTC will focus on how patients purportedly react to price increases, as measured by "diversion ratios," when deciding which hospital mergers to investigate further for potential anticompetitive effects.
On July 25, 2012, the Third Circuit issued its decision in In re American Capital Equipment LLC and Skinner Engine Co., 688 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2012), becoming the first circuit court to align itself with numerous district courts that have allowed bankruptcy courts to reject a Chapter 11 plan prior to a confirmation hearing.
Taxpayers that engaged in transactions under §381(a), including tax-free liquidations under §332 and certain tax-free reorganizations under §361, previously could not change their methods of accounting for the year of the transaction using the automatic consent procedures under Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1 C.B.
In the first decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, concluding that a defendant’s bankruptcy filing does not prevent the district court from ruling on a contempt motion for violation of a temporary restraining order protecting plaintiff’s trademarks. Dominic’s Restaurant of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, Case Nos. 10-3376; -3377 (6th Circuit July 5, 2012) (Batchelder, C.J.; McKeague, J.; Quist, D.J., sitting by designation).
On July 9, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC (“Sunbeam”). It is a landmark opinion for trademark licensees whose licenses are rejected in bankruptcy by trademark owners.
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a secured lender’s right to credit-bid at a bankruptcy sale of assets encumbered by such lender’s liens. In addition to solidifying the rights and protections afforded to a secured creditor in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court lessened some of the uncertainty associated with the acquisition strategy by which a potential buyer purchases claims secured by the targeted assets of a troubled company and seeks to exercise such secured creditor’s rights as to such assets.
In Loop 76, LLC, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently held that a bankruptcy court may consider whether a creditor received a third party source of payment (e.g., a guaranty) when determining whether that creditor’s claim is “substantially similar” to other claims for purposes of plan classification under 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).