In In re Washington Mutual, Inc., No. 08-12229 (MFW), 2011 WL 4090757 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept.

On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit held that Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("Trustee"), utilized the correct methodology to determine the "net equity" of each Madoff investor under the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA").

On June 28, 2011, the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) shields from avoidance in bankruptcy cases an issuer's payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de CV, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. ALFA, S.A.B. de C.V., Nos. 09-5122-bk(L), 09-5142-bk (Con), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13177 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011). The decision marks the first time an appeals court has considered whether redemption payments constitute "settlement payments" under section 546(e).

In a recent ruling, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a per se rule that only corporate insiders can have their debt claims recharacterized as equity. Instead, in In re Lothian Oil Inc., 2011 WL 3473354 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2011), the Court of Appeals held that "recharacterization extends beyond insiders and is part of the bankruptcy courts' authority to allow and disallow claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502." Thus, all creditors, regardless of their insider status, are susceptible to having their claims recharacterized as equity.

The Facts of the Case

The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.

In RGH Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2011 WL 2471542 (N.Y.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled in Stern v. Marshall[1] that the congressional grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on counterclaims to proofs of claim was unconstitutional. For the litigants, this decision brought an end to an expensive and drawn out litigation between the estates of former Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband, Pierce Marshall, which Justice Roberts writing for the majority analogized to the fictional litigation in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).  

The second priority lien held by a junior lien holder is a property interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.In re Three Strokes L.P., 379 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008). Inasmuch as a senior lien holder’s foreclosure proceedings would have the effect of extinguishing the debtor’s second lien interest, a court may only lift the stay and permit the foreclosure to proceed upon such senior lien holder’s showing of adequate protection.