Facts
Solicitors, Stevensdrake, sought payment of costs from insolvency practitioner, Hunt. As liquidator, Hunt took action against two former administrators of an estate, and retained Stevensdrake for assistance. Early in their relationship, the parties agreed that Hunt would not be liable if there were no recoveries, and that the solicitors would be paid when there was a recovery from any source. The parties later entered a conditional fee agreement (CFA) with an express term stipulating that Hunt would be personally liable for unpaid fees.
Facts
The respondents applied to set aside an order permitting the liquidators to serve the ‘Main Application’ on the respondents out of the jurisdiction (‘Set Aside Application’). Grounds of the application were: (i) the liquidators could not establish a serious issue to be tried/ reasonable prospect of success on the Main Application; and (ii) the initial without notice application had been procured by misrepresentation and/or material non-disclosure.
Recent piece-meal amendments to the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 seem to have cumulated into a restructuring solution that is starting to be considered predictable, quick and fair, especially when compared to the pre-amendment system. With its new restructuring approach, which shares many of the same characteristics as an English Scheme of Arrangement, Spanish companies have finally been given much-needed space and time to develop an appropriate restructuring strategy.
While the CIS nations have recently provided a multitude of sizeable restructuring cases, the region’s dominant force, Russia, has stood up reasonably well to lengthy economic decline, economic sanctions and the collapse of oil and gas prices. There are now signs however, that its complex troubles are pushing certain companies towards a restructuring or insolvency position.
In light of the UK’s cram down and director-friendly processes, in particular its scheme of arrangement model, major European economies such as France, Germany and Italy have worked hard to develop regimes that give greater emphasis to pre-insolvency alternatives. These new regimes create cram down mechanisms and encourage debtor-in-possession (DIP) financings, ultimately aiming to make restructuring plans more accessible, more efficient, and crucially more reliable; essentially more in tune with the Anglo-American approach to insolvency and restructuring.
Much like the English Scheme of Arrangement which has become a popular debt restructuring solution for international debtors, the English High Court is an attractive forum for insolvency litigation thanks to the potent combination of wide-ranging powers available to Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) under the Insolvency Act 1986, and the increasing availability of litigation funding arrangements in the London market.
Liability management exercises (“LMEs”) are increasing in the bond and capital market and are often used in relatively benign situations. They are certainly not always a precursor to a full-scale restructuring or insolvency.
Prior to the recent collapse in oil values, prices existed at over $100 a barrel for over three years. It made the economics of oil exploration, production and sale comparatively straightforward, but embedded costs into the industry.
Does section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986 void payments made by the insolvent company’s bank after the presentation of a winding-up petition but pursuant to payment instructions issued by the company before presentation of the petition?