On June 23, 2011, the US Supreme Court issued a narrowly-divided decision in Stern v. Marshall, limiting Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over certain types of claims. The Court found that while the Bankruptcy Court was statutorily authorized to enter final judgment on a tortious interference counterclaim (as a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)), it was not constitutionally authorized to do so.
A Delaware bankruptcy judge recently held that a landlord's right of first refusal to purchase a debtor/tenant's liquor license (the "Option") was unenforceable since the debtor rejected the lease containing the Option1. Disagreeing with a ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals2, the Delaware court held that the Option provision was a non-severable part of an executory contract that was not subject to specific performance.
The Facts
The UK Pensions Regulator (the Regulator) has just announced that it has reached a settlement with the intended target of its first Contribution Notice (CN), with the result that the CN has been issued, but for a far lower amount than the Regulator originally sought. This case gives important guidance on the situations in which the Regulator believes it will be justified in issuing a CN, and on the potential liabilities targets may face.
The Moral Hazard Powers
On 26 January 2011 the European Commission declared the so-called Restructuring Clause (Sanierungsklausel) (Sec. 8c (1a) of the German Corporate Income Tax Act (CTA)) as inconsistent with EU funding guidelines. The decision of the European Commission is criticized by national experts and stresses the German economy with a hardly tolerable uncertainty as regards tax issues in restructurings.
Introduction
On 8 March 20111, the French Supreme Court issued an important decision for the restructuring, finance and private equity communities and their advisers in connection with the on-going litigation surrounding the Coeur Défense restructuring.
Representing a mortgagee holding liens on 37 unsold condominium units, Herrick, Feinstein successfully blocked a debtor's effort to confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization via cramdown. The plan envisioned sales of 27 unsold units over five years, deferred payments to the mortgagee at the rate of 4.75%, and scheduled principal pay downs from the sale of units.
The Delaware Chancery Court has found the recapitalization of a media production company entirely fair. Faced with the possibility of bankruptcy and unable to service its debt, the company's board of directors (acting through its special committee) approved a revised recapitalization plan proposed by the company's majority stockholder and primary debt holder. The special committee retained independent legal counsel and a financial advisor. The special committee, after engaging in extensive due diligence, determined to negotiate the recapitalization proposal.
A New York bankruptcy judge has refused to permit a debtor to use rents generated by its real property because the rents absolutely assigned to the lender pre-petition were not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.2 Before the bankruptcy filing, the lender sent the borrower a default notice and terminated the borrower's license to collect rents. The lender also directed tenants to pay rents to it and not the borrower, commenced a foreclosure action, and sought appointment of a receiver.
Reversing the bankruptcy court, a Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a debtor in a single asset real estate case did not provide adequate protection to a creditor by providing replacement liens in the rents where there was no equity cushion.4 The notion that granting the lender a lien on future rents to replace the expenditure of prior months' rents was rejected. Accordingly, the appellate panel held that the debtor could not use rents collected post-petition to pay ordinary administrative expenses, such as fees of its professionals.
It is commonly known that a borrower's agreement with a third party not to file a bankruptcy case is unenforceable due to public policy considerations. Accordingly, lenders have searched for ways to make it difficult or painful for their borrowers to file for bankruptcy, such as imposing the requirement that prior authorization of an independent director or member be a prerequisite to a bankruptcy filing by the borrower, or requiring the borrower's principal to execute a non-recourse carve-out guaranty that would impose personal liability should the borrower file for bankruptcy.