When a lessee fails to comply with a notice to remedy a non-payment or other lease default, the lessor may be entitled to terminate the lease and retake possession of the property. This is commonly done by changing the locks.
However, a lessee who wants to save itself from being evicted can apply to court to prevent the lessor from retaking possession. In Queensland this application is made under section 124 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and is known as an application for relief against forfeiture.
When is relief against forfeiture granted?
Last week the Supreme Court of New South Wales provided another timely reminder to ensure that all security interests are correctly registered on the Personal Property and Securities Register (PPSR) through the decision In the matter of OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2017] NSWSC 21.
The facts
Alleasing Pty Ltd leased a crushing and screening plant (for approximately $4 million annually in rent) and spare parts for the crusher to OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Limited.
Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") states the right of a bondholder to receive payments pursuant to an indenture security cannot be "impaired or affected without the consent of such holder." Historically, issuers and bondholders have not engaged in extensive litigation based on the argument that Section 316(b) provides a broad restriction protecting bondholders' substantive right to actually receive such payments.
Failing to register a lessor’s security interest on the PPSR over plant and equipment at leased premises can result in the lessor’s unperfected security interest passing to the administrator of the lessee.
In the recent decision of Flown Pty Ltd v Goldrange Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 419, a lessee’s administrator successfully retained ownership of plant and equipment (which were not fixtures) in the leased premises.
Background
In the recent case of Hadley v BetHQ Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1263, the debtor company, BetHQ, came to grief when a statutory demand was validly served at the company’s registered office in Brisbane as shown in ASIC records. The premises were a serviced office; however BetHQ had ceased operations at the serviced office and had moved its operations to Victoria.
When a secured creditor appoints a receiver it is usual for them to sign an agreement setting out the terms of the receiver’s appointment, including payment of the receiver’s remuneration, costs and expenses. Appointment documents commonly contain indemnity clauses in which the secured creditor agrees to indemnify the receiver in specified circumstances.
In our previous bulletin we discussed the ‘safe harbour’ model in the Government’s suggested reforms to the current insolvency laws.
This bulletin considers another of the focus questions in the Proposal Paper: the voiding of ipso facto clauses relating to insolvency events.
Background
On 29 April 2016, the Federal Government released a Proposals Paper titled ‘Improving bankruptcy and insolvency laws’.
The Government is proposing these reforms to encourage entrepreneurship and investment. It hopes to reduce the stigma and detriment around failed business ventures, while still balancing the need to protect creditors.
In a prior post, we set forth the potential liability of employers for collection of debts owed by employees in violation of the bankruptcy stay. To protect themselves from such liability, employers that accrue claims against their employees in the ordinary course of business should implement written protocols designed in consultation with bankruptcy counsel.
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held that the Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) safe harbors do not prevent a liquidation trust from pursuing some state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims assigned to the trust by creditors.1 Notably, the Bankruptcy Court declined to follow the Second Circuit's recent Tribune decision, in which the Second Circuit concluded that the Section 546(e) safe harbors apply to state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims on federal preemption grounds.2 Instead, the Bankruptcy Court decided that federal preemption did not appl