In the recent decision of Heavy Plant Leasing [2018] NSWSC 707, a creditor successfully defended an unfair preference claim by establishing it did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the insolvency of the debtor company, who was a subcontractor in the earth moving business.
The most common way of defending a liquidator’s unfair preferences claim is to rely upon section 588FG(2) of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth); commonly called the ‘good faith defence’.
Commonly, a creditor being sued by a liquidator to refund an alleged unfair preference is owed money by the company in liquidation.
Liquidators argue that under section 553(c)(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Act) a creditor is not able to set-off the outstanding indebtedness owed by the company to the creditor to reduce any liability of the creditor to refund any unfair preference. Similar arguments are made by liquidators in relation to insolvent trading claims.
A snapshot of the court decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court recently scrutinized the proper application of the safe harbor found in Section 546(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code1 in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting Inc.2 While the Supreme Court's decision narrowed the reach of the safe harbor, it did little to change the landscape for the multi-billion dollar U.S. structured finance industry, including warehouse lending.
On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court in a significant ruling held in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. that transfers of property of a debtor in which financial institutions are mere conduits or intermediaries may be avoidable. The Court ruled that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code do not protect such transfers from avoidance.
On 11 September 2017, the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill 2017 was passed by the Senate. The Bill features two key changes to the Corporations Act:
Just because a liquidator asserts you have received an unfair preference, does not necessarily mean you have or that there are no potential defences available to you.
It is common for commercial contracts to contain ipso facto clauses, which allow a party to terminate or modify the terms of the contract where the other party experiences an insolvency event. A concern addressed by the Government is that these clauses can prevent a financially distressed company from turning their situation around.
The High Court’s recent decision in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 has confirmed a bankruptcy court can exercise a discretion to go behind the judgment debt where sufficient reason is shown for questioning whether there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor.
The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.
In the recent decision of Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Lee (Bankrupt) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953, Cooper Grace Ward acted for the trustee in bankruptcy, who sought directions from the Court regarding the administration of a trading trust where the bankrupt was the trustee.
Facts