On August 27, 2013, in a case of first impression, the Third Circuit rejected an attack on a foreign liquidator’s petition for recognition of an Australian insolvency proceeding under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code premised on the argument that the foreign proceeding violated US public policy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently shut down litigation filed by plaintiffs who had represented to a Bankruptcy Court that their claims were worth far less than they were attempting to recover in a lawsuit filed in federal district court. Queen v. TA Operating, LLC, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 4419322, (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013).

It should be common knowledge that a secured creditor, having received proper notice in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, faces the risk that its lien will be extinguished if it fails to object to a reorganization plan that does not specifically preserve the lien. Apparently, however, not all secured lenders realize this risk, and some fall prey to a trap for the unwary in §1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code by failing to protect their liens and place their collateral at risk.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") recently affirmed a broad reading of the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") section 546(e), which protects from avoidance both "margin payments" and "settlement payments" as well as transfers made in connection with a "securities contract." In Quebecor, the Second Circuit affirmed decisions of the bankruptcy and district courts and held that the purchase by Quebecor World (USA) Inc.

After a company has been declared bankrupt, the liquidator in charge of the bankrupt estate will process personal data on that bankrupt company’s behalf. The liquidator would then be considered a so-called data controller within the meaning of the Dutch Data Protection Act (DDPA).

A Dutch Court of Appeal recently upheld a lower court’s decision that a liquidator has the right to access data concerning the administration of a bankrupt company, the data of which are kept by a third party. It also held that this right, however, does not imply that the third party must provide the data in an orderly manner without being adequately compensated for it.

On a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion in the Derivium Capital, LLC bankruptcy case on May 24, 2013,1 affirming the District Court’s ruling that Grayson Consulting Inc. ("Grayson"), the chapter 7 Trustee’s assignee, could not avoid as fraudulent conveyances Wachovia’s2 commissions, fees, and margin interest payments because those payments were protected from recovery by the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") section 546(e).

On April 16, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") issued its decision in In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.,¹ in which the court held that (1) the relevant time for analyzing a debtor’s center of main interest ("COMI") for purposes of recognizing a foreign proceeding is at or around the time a petition for recognition is filed; (2) the determination of COMI is dependent on the facts of each case, which may include insolvency proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction; and (3) the public policy exception to relief sough

On March 1, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. et al, (Inre Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.)¹ (“Texas Grand Prairie”) affirming an order of the bankruptcy court confirming a debtor’s plan of reorganization over the objection the secured creditor that argued that the interest rate proposed by the plan to be paid to the secured creditor was too low in violation of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b).

On February 26, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.¹ (“Camp Bowie”). The bankruptcy court confirmed a debtor’s plan of reorganization over the objection of the secured creditor that argued the impaired accepting class of the cramdown plan was “artificially” impaired and that the plan was not proposed in good faith.