On March 4, 2014, the United States Supreme Court decided Law v. Siegel, No. 12-5196. The Court held that the bankruptcy court violated the express terms of § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code when it ordered that the $75,000 protected by a debtor's homestead exemption be available to pay a trustee's attorney's fees as an administrative expense. The order exceeded the limits of the bankruptcy court's authority under § 105(a) of the Code and its inherent powers.
Earlier this week, the English Court of Appeal overturned the recent decisions in Goldacre (Goldacre (Offices) Ltd v Nortel Networks UK Ltd [2009] EWCH 3389 (Ch);2011 Ch 455) and Luminar (Leisure (Norwich) II Ltd v Luminar Lava Ignite [2012] EWCH 951 (Ch)) regarding the treatment of rent in an administration.
Recently, two courts of appeal dismissed as moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) appeals of orders authorizing the sale of assets. The courts’ analysis focused on whether granting the appellant’s relief from the lower courts’ order would affect the asset sale. Thus the trend in the appellate courts is that only appeals that will not affect the sale itself (such as a dispute over the distribution of sale proceeds) are not subject to being dismissed as moot.
Numerous bankruptcy trustees have attempted to claw back from colleges and universities — and even from private elementary and secondary schools — the tuition payments that parents made on behalf of their children, when the parents subsequently filed for bankruptcy.
In determining their preference liability exposure, creditors typically consider whether they have provided any subsequent “new value” to the debtor after they have received an alleged preferential payment. Debtors and trustees frequently take the position that creditors cannot use as a defense any new value that has been repaid to the creditor post-petition through critical vendor payments or pursuant to Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy courts have ruled differently on this issue.
Due to inconsistent decisions in the Second Circuit and Third Circuit, there has been some uncertainty as to whether a purchaser of a bankruptcy claim is subject to defenses that a debtor would have against the original creditor. Recently, this issue was settled with respect to cases filed in the Third Circuit.
In Crystal Palace FC Ltd v Kavanagh & Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 1410, the Court of Appeal considered whether dismissals made by an administrator to keep a business alive with the ultimate aim of selling it were automatically unfair under TUPE, in which case liability would pass to the buyer.
On October 7, 2013, the United States Supreme Court refused to review a Seventh Circuit decision1 in the Castleton Plaza, LP case, which held that a new value plan proposed by the debtor in which an equity-holder’s spouse would provide a cash infusion to the debtor in exchange for 100 percent of the reorganiz
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently confirmed that a channeling injunction pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
On August 27, 2013, in a case of first impression, the Third Circuit rejected an attack on a foreign liquidator’s petition for recognition of an Australian insolvency proceeding under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code premised on the argument that the foreign proceeding violated US public policy.