Fulltext Search

By now, both indenture trustees and offices of the U.S. Trustee around the country are undoubtedly familiar with the Southern District of New York’s 2014 opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 508 B.R. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Lehman II), finding that individual committee members must establish a “substantial contribution” to the case under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code before the payment of their fees will be approved as part of a Chapter 11 plan. In the years since the Lehman II decision, however, U.S.

Administrators will note with concern the decision of the East London Employment Tribunal in Spencer v Lehman Brothers (in administration) and Others, which suggests that administrators can be held to be personally liable for the discrimination of employees of the business in administration.

On January 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Peck struck down a provision that used the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”) to trigger subordination of a Lehman subsidiary’s swap claim against a securitization vehicle in the United Kingdom.1

On May 26, 2009, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated U.S. chapter 11 debtors (“Lehman” or the “U.S. Debtors”) filed a motion (“Motion”) requesting the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (“Bankruptcy Court”) to set August 24, 2009 at 5:00 p.m. (ET) as the deadline for filing proofs of claim against the U.S. Debtors (the “Bar Date”). The Motion1 seeks entry of a proposed order (“Proposed Order”), that (i) establishes the Bar Date; (ii) approves the Proof of Claim Form; and (iii) approves the proposed notice procedures and form for the Bar Date notices.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was a major test of the procedures developed by market participants to address counterparty credit risk and has uncovered deficiencies in risk management policies and their application.

On November 13, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors in Chapter 11 (collectively, “Lehman”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of procedures (the “Procedures”) for the assumption and assignment of derivative contracts not yet terminated by its various counterparties, as well confirmation of Lehman’s right to enter into settlement agreements for the termination of derivative contracts that have been terminated by its counterparties post-petition.

This alert describes issues to consider when a derivatives dealer counterparty becomes insolvent.We address below issues involving termination of a master agreement, close-out netting of underlying trades and collateral. Even though this alert focuses on the bankruptcy of a dealer, many of the issues would also arise in connection with the bankruptcy of most non-dealer counterparties.

1. Existence of an Event of Default and Termination

a. Existence of an Event of Default