Avago Technologies Wireless (USA) Manufacturing Inc. acquired PLX Technologies, Inc. for $6.50 per share in cash. After the $300 million merger closed, certain former PLX stockholders sued for damages, alleging that the PLX directors had breached their fiduciary breaches, aided and abetted by both Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P. (a hedge fund that is an activist stockholder and had three designees on the PLX board) and the PLX board’s financial advisor (the “Banker”).
Credit agreements by their terms commonly bar the borrower from seeking punitive, indirect, special or consequential damages for a breach of the agreement by lenders and their affiliates. The clauses, as enforced, prevent a borrower from obtaining damages for harm that may be suffered by the borrower's business if the lender wrongfully declines to fund. The clauses prevent lenders from exposure to open-ended damages claims if the lenders refuse to lend to a borrower, including damages that are the direct and indirect result of the failure to lend.
On October 20, 2017, in In re MPM Silicones, LLC ("Momentive"), Nos. 15-1682, 15-1771, 15-1824, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), adopted the Sixth Circuit's two-step approach to determining an appropriate cramdown interest rate that, in certain circumstances, results in the application of a market rate of interest. In doing so, the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and district court holdings on the cramdown interest rate issue.
Introduction – Distressed Issuers and Borrowers
On June 22, Sears Canada Inc. ("Sears Canada") and certain affiliates1 (collectively, the "Sears Canada Group") sought and obtained insolvency protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "Court"), which in turn appointed FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (FTI or the "Monitor") as monitor.
For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a "bet the company" litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.
For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a “bet the company” litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.
On January 17, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp., No. 15-2124-cv(L), 15-2141-cv(CON), reversing the Southern District of New York's holding that only a non-consensual amendment to an indenture's core payment terms violates Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).
On November 17, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC, No. 16-1351 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2016) clarified the often-muddy interplay between indenture acceleration provisions and "make-whole" redemption provisions, holding that Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC and EFIH Finance Inc. (collectively, "EFIH") were unable to avoid paying lenders approximately $800 million in expected interest by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy.