Congress enacted the ordinary course of business defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to protect recurring, customary transactions in order to encourage the continuation of business with and the extension of credit to a financially distressed customer.

Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) litigations have sometimes yield "shocking results". There is no pun intended here. This article discusses a recent case where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana waded into the spine tingling issue of whether electricity is a good that is subject to Section 503(b)(9) administrative priority status.

Large businesses and organizations that self-insure their legally mandated insurance requirements often use “fronting” policies in which the policyholder must reimburse insurers for all losses and expenses paid on the policyholder’s behalf. These policyholders must furnish substantial collateral to secure repayment, typically, enough to pay many years’ worth of actual and anticipated claims. This can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, and typically exacerbates cash flow and balance sheet problems for policyholders under financial stress.

A High Court judgment by Mr. Justice Richards handed down on January 29 has confirmed that a client’s open positions on trades, made with a firm regulated by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) that subsequently enters into an administration or liquidation, should be valued by reference to the market value of the trades at the time of the firm’s failure rather than at the date the positions are closed out.

The Ninth Circuit recently held that: (1) bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on all fraudulent transfer claims against non-claimants, whether brought under state or federal law, and (2) a defendant can waive such an argument by not asserting the applicability of Stern v. Marshall¹ at the trial level.² Further, in dicta, the court noted that bankruptcy courts may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in matters in which the bankruptcy court cannot issue final orders.

The US House of Representatives Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (Committee) has released a report on the collapse of MF Global (Report). The Report finds that Jon Corzine, MF Global’s Chairman and CEO, made a number of decisions that ultimately caused MF Global’s bankruptcy. The Committee also found fault with the regulatory agencies, rating agencies and the New York Federal Reserve Board, among others.

California’s AB 506 process was intended to help a municipality in restructuring its debt obligations and avoid bankruptcy. However, the lessons of the bankruptcies of the City of Stockton, the Town of Mammoth Lakes and the City of San Bernardino support the reality that a meaningful restructure requires material involvement by the major stakeholders. California’s recent wave of municipal bankruptcies tend to show that the AB 506 process has not changed this reality, but rather made a difficult process longer and more arduous.

Often, corporate boards do not consider how to handle a company bankruptcy until the moment insolvency is looming.

In two recent decisions,² the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions by large chapter 11 debtors to approve executive bonus plans designated as key employee incentive plans ("KEIP"), finding that the proposed KEIPs actually were disguised and impermissible retention or "pay to stay" bonus plans for insiders. These are the first opinions to reject so-called KEIPs following a recent line of cases that have approved KEIPs for insiders.