In a brief but significant opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware reversed a decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and allowed more than $30 million in unsecured, post-petition fees incurred by an indenture trustee ("Indenture Trustee").1 In reversing, the District Court relied upon a uniform body of Court of Appeals opinions issued on the subject.

Investors currently relying on certain of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions to save them from clawback claims should consider finding new shelter. The U.S. Supreme Court in Merit Management Group, LP v.

On October 20, 2017, in In re MPM Silicones, LLC ("Momentive"), Nos. 15-1682, 15-1771, 15-1824, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), adopted the Sixth Circuit's two-step approach to determining an appropriate cramdown interest rate that, in certain circumstances, results in the application of a market rate of interest. In doing so, the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and district court holdings on the cramdown interest rate issue.

On June 22, Sears Canada Inc. ("Sears Canada") and certain affiliates1 (collectively, the "Sears Canada Group") sought and obtained insolvency protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "Court"), which in turn appointed FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (FTI or the "Monitor") as monitor.

Twenty years of straight-line growth for e-commerce and online shopping has created fortunes for technology investors, savings for consumers and vast efficiencies for a new and constantly evolving ecosystem of suppliers and supply chains. Traditional brick-and-mortar outlets (and the retail chains that own

them) are struggling to adapt to this new dimension of competition. The

relationship between e-commerce and traditional retail activity seems to have

reached a tipping point in the United States. 

For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a "bet the company" litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.

For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a “bet the company” litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.

Bondholders have long feared "the tyranny of the majority" and historically have found limited comfort in a provision of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") that provides minority bondholders with a veto over proposed legal modifications to core payment terms. In the immediate wake of the Second Circuit's recent decision in Marblegate Asset Management v.

On January 17, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp., No. 15-2124-cv(L), 15-2141-cv(CON), reversing the Southern District of New York's holding that only a non-consensual amendment to an indenture's core payment terms violates Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).

On November 17, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC, No. 16-1351 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2016) clarified the often-muddy interplay between indenture acceleration provisions and "make-whole" redemption provisions, holding that Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC and EFIH Finance Inc. (collectively, "EFIH") were unable to avoid paying lenders approximately $800 million in expected interest by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy.