The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

With the possibility of a major stock brokerage liquidation appearing more likely than it has been in recent periods, the effect of a liquidation on customers and financial counterparties has become of great interest to many of our clients and others.

We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.

A recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation, et al. ("Delphi") bankruptcy case calls into question the effectiveness of power of attorney provisions found in many claim purchase agreements. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, presiding over the Delphi bankruptcy proceeding, held that claims purchasers could not submit cure notices in reliance on powers of attorney.

Delphi Sent Cure Notices Only to Contract Counterparties

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.

Recently, a number of high profile cases have emerged involving the application of material adverse change ("MAC") provisions, primarily in the context of leveraged buyouts.2 This week, the application of MAC clauses to a financing commitment arose in the context of the Solutia Inc. ("Solutia") bankruptcy proceeding. On February 6, 2008, Solutia filed an adversary proceeding against certain lenders (the "Lenders")3 seeking to enforce a commitment to provide $2 billion in exit financing.

Following a recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy case approving cure notices and cure claims procedures, purchasers of unsecured trade claims originating out of executory contracts or unexpired leases should take special precautions to protect their rights or risk impairment or loss of such claims to the extent they become cure claims.

On September 25, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) announced that two UK-based firms have been placed into liquidation by the UK High Court following the FSA’s intervention. The FSA believes that these scams may have fraudulently persuaded up to 800 people into buying worthless shares. Investors are believed to have lost up to £3.5 million ($7.5 million).

Chesteroak Limited and Bingen Investments Limited were shut down following allegations that they were dealing in or arranging deals in shares without proper authorization.

The District Court sustained claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deepening insolvency asserted by the successor-in-interest to the Committee of Unsecured Creditors of DVI, a defunct company, against DVI’s former officers and directors.

In proceedings commenced by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK High Court ruled in December 2004 that Adrian Sam & Co (ASC) and John Martin, one of ASC’s two partners, were knowingly involved in the UK activities of an illegal overseas investment firm (a boiler room) and they were ordered to pay £360,000 (approximately $700,000) to 63 investors involved in the boiler room scam. A bankruptcy order was granted against John Martin in August 2006.