On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, addressing the question of whether a company can use bankruptcy to resolve the liability of non-debtor third parties. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and an injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge the claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.
On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. ____ (2024) holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the inclusion of non-consensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans. This decision settles a long-standing circuit split on the propriety of such releases and clarifies that a plan may not provide for the release of claims against non-debtors without the consent of the claimants.
On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 5-4 decision rejecting the nonconsensual releases of the Sackler family in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy case. The split is an interesting alignment of Justices: Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson; Kavanaugh for the dissent, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor and Kagan.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy has long been thought of as anathema to commercial real estate (CRE) lenders. This is due to the debtor-friendly bankruptcy forum, particularly with respect to (i) the up to 18 month exclusivity period during which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization and (ii) threats of a "cram-down" plan used to lever concessions from lenders. These provisions can be, and often were, abused by debtors with no real rehabilitative intent using bankruptcy only as a leverage tool.
In the decision in Woodhouse, in the matter of Panoramic Resources Limited [2024] FCA 449, handed down this week (1 May 2024) by Feutrill J, the Federal Court of Australia considered the meaning of ‘Secured Property ‘as defined in a specific security deed and the extent to which phrases such as ‘…in respect of’ could expand the types of collateral the subject of that defined term (and hence the collateral the subject of the specific security d
Legal proceedings need to be filed before the end of any relevant limitation period, otherwise they will be time-barred — often irreparably. There are various reasons why a person may delay commencing proceedings – for example, they may be waiting on litigation funding before prosecuting their claim or need more time to gather evidence in order to decide whether to proceed.
The decision in RPPS v Brookfield is the first recorded instance of s 151 of the PPSA being enforced (with a $30,000 penalty imposed for an improper registration). It serves as a caution to those making spurious registrations, but reasonably diligent and responsible parties should have no cause for alarm.
The decision in RPPS v Brookfield is the first recorded instance of s 151 of the PPSA being enforced (with a $30,000 penalty imposed for an improper registration). It serves as a caution to those making spurious registrations, but reasonably diligent and responsible parties should have no cause for alarm.
Overview of section 151 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009
In its recent German Pellets decision, the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor could not assert its indemnification defenses in a suit brought by the trustee of a liquidation trust because the Chapter 11 plan’s express language permanently enjoined the defenses and the creditor chose not to participate in the debtor’s bankruptcy despite having actual knowledge of it.
The United States Supreme Court recently accepted review of In re Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., 60 F.4th 73 (4th Cir.