In the wake of several high-profile collapses of cryptocurrency exchanges, most notably FTX, Celsius, and Voyager, the state of the digital asset landscape is ever-changing, with more questions and landmines than clear paths forward. Among the many issues that arise in these bankruptcy cases is the question of how to treat and classify digital assets, especially cryptocurrencies—e.g., who owns the cryptocurrencies deposited by customers.
Crypto firm bankruptcies and resulting disruption in the crypto ecosystem will continue to exacerbate liquidity and regulatory concerns in this space. Signs of contagion are evident as prices of almost every cryptocurrency type have halved in recent months. Since all participants supporting the crypto ecosystem are at risk, managing that risk is critical.
Fund managers should be prepared on multiple fronts, as the following examples illustrate:
Everything, everywhere, all at once is our risk thesis for 2023, but one must not forget about concentration risk. This issue has rocketed up diligence agendas for LPs and GPs alike as the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank proved it really was the bank for venture capital.The entry of SVB into receivership on March 10, 2023 highlighted just how central it had become to U.S.
US governmental authorities, including the US Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, took actions to provide both insured and uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) (as well as Signature Bank) access to their deposits beginning Monday, March 13. However, despite these actions, many customers are still dealing with the aftermath of an uncertain weekend, and practical questions remain to be answered.
Demand for virtual currency services, including custody services, has soared in the past several years. Like their counterparts in traditional finance, these custodians are stewards of retail and institutional customer funds and serve an important and valuable function. However, as evidenced by a number of headline-grabbing failures during the lingering crypto winter, inadequate disclosures and poor custodial practices can seriously harm retail and institutional customers alike.
Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.
A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.
In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.
A panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in the Ultra Petroleum make-whole and post-petition interest dispute, with the majority holding that the solvent-debtor exception survived the enactment of the US Bankruptcy Code.
Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.