Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on February 20 in the much-watched and even more intensely discussed trademark dispute Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC. The case presents the difficult and multifaceted question: Does bankruptcy law insulate the right of a trademark licensee to continue using the licensed mark despite the bankrupt trademark licensor’s decision to “reject” the remaining term of the trademark license?

The Personal Properties Securities Register (PPSR) will be seven years old on 30 January 2019; accordingly, security interests with seven year registration periods will, unless renewed, expire from 30 January 2019.

The seven year security interest is the most common registration period and is the maximum period of registration for goods with a serial number (such as motor vehicles). According to the Australian Financial Security Authority, an estimated 115,239 registrations will expire in January 2019.

On July 19, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals entered a decision upholding the results of a foreclosure sale against a debtor’s allegation that the sale was a preference because the bankruptcy estate could have sold the property for a higher price. Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre), Case No. 17-2889 (3d Cir. July 19, 2018).

(Excerpted from “Retail Bankruptcies – Protections for Landlords,” Practical Law Journal, May 2018, by Lars Fuller)

Due to increasing competition from online sellers, recent years have seen a dramatic uptick in Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by multistate brick-and-mortar retailers – some that have dozens, or even hundreds, of storefronts. These bankruptcies create challenges for the commercial landlords that own the shopping centers, malls and other establishments that those retailers rented.

Ground leases are fairly common but sometimes overlooked property interests. A succinct but adequate definition of a ground lease was articulated by Herbert Thorndike Tiffany (Tiffany on Real Property § 85.50 [3d ed.]) as follows:

The Supreme Court held that a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for purposes of determining the application of the exception to discharge set forth in Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling, 2018 WL 2465174 (June 4, 2018).

In the recent court decision of Trenfield v HAG Import Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2018] QDC 107, the liquidators recovered unfair preferences from a retention of title creditor who argued it was a secured creditor.

The issues

In the recent decision of Heavy Plant Leasing [2018] NSWSC 707, a creditor successfully defended an unfair preference claim by establishing it did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the insolvency of the debtor company, who was a subcontractor in the earth moving business.

The most common way of defending a liquidator’s unfair preferences claim is to rely upon section 588FG(2) of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth); commonly called the ‘good faith defence’.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Mgmt. Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018), held that transfers made by and to entities that are not “financial institutions” or other covered entities fall outside of the scope of the § 546(e) safe harbor even if they are made through financial institutions or other covered entities. The Supreme Court’s decision resolves a circuit split over how the § 546(e) safe harbor applies to transactions involving conduit entities and could impact future disputes involving safe harbors under the Bankruptcy Code.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018), held that transfers made by or to entities that are not “financial institutions” or other covered entities fall outside the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)’s “safe harbor” from a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code, even if those transfers are made through financial institutions or other covered entities.