One of the most powerful tools a chapter 11 debtor has is the ability to assume or reject executory contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. In bankruptcy parlance, when a debtor “rejects” an executory contract, it is considered as though the debtor breached the agreement as of the date it filed for bankruptcy and sheds the debtor’s obligation to perform under the rejected contract. The non-debtor party receives a claim for damages arising from the debtor’s breach; however, in many cases, it will be worth only pennies on the dollar. The converse of rejection is
The UK Supreme Court has handed down an important judgment in the conjoined cases of Rubin and another v Eurofinance SA and others and New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (in Liquidation) and another v AE Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46, which provides vital clarification on the effect of foreign insolvency judgments on the UK courts. The judgment was handed down yesterday.
Background & Court of Appeal
In a recent decision authored by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, Docket No. 11-3920 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012)) held that the licensee of a trademark does not necessarily lose the right to use the licensed marks when a debtor-licensor rejects the underlying license agreement in its bankruptcy case. In so holding, the Court rejected a contrary decision reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
In 2009, the owners and management of The Philadelphia Inquirer, one of the nation's largest daily circulation newspapers, proposed a bankruptcy plan that attacked secured creditors' rights to bid their loans. When the District Court and the Third Circuit both approved the tactic, the plan gained national attention.
Those thinking that the trials and tribulations of the recession may have passed them by and that, if all else failed, at least the pension was safe, may have to think again following two recent court decisions in which pensions came under attack from creditors and trustees in bankruptcy.
The vexed question of whether a future right to receive a pension can be attached to satisfy a judgment, or can be claimed by a trustee in bankruptcy, has long since troubled the courts.
Baker Hostetler serves as court-appointed counsel to Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC (“BLMIS”). In January of 2011, the SIPA Trustee obtained approval from the United States Bankruptcy Court for a $5 billion settlement for BLMIS customers with allowed claims. At the same time, the Bankruptcy Court also issued a permanent injunction with respect to claims that were duplicative or derivative of the SIPA Trustee’s claims. After an appeal, the District Court affirmed the settlement and the injunction in March of 2012.
An administrator who was sued in relation to contractual liabilities which he entered as administrator of a company was found to have no personal liability for those contracts or for the costs of the litigation.
In the recent case of Wright Hassall LLP v Morris1 the claimant advanced various arguments in an attempt to make the administrator personally liable for a costs order in litigation where the defendant companies were unable to pay. These arguments were rejected.
Bankruptcy cases can be expensive affairs not only for the debtor, but also for creditors trying to obtain payment on their claims. A Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida recently approved a provision in a chapter 11 plan allowing for certain unsecured creditors to be reimbursed for their legal fees if their participation in the case helped maximize recoveries for other creditors, even though the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly allow for this kind of reimbursement.
Oftentimes in bankruptcy, when one entity files for bankruptcy relief, the subsidiaries or affiliates also file. Sometimes these entities are "substantively consolidated" for bankruptcy purposes, thus combining the assets and liabilities into a single pool and attributing them to a single entity. Substantive consolidation has been permitted when, for example, debtors have abused corporate formalities or creditors have treated the separate entities as a single economic unit and their affairs were hopelessly entangled.