Recently, Corinthian Colleges, Inc., one of the United States' largest for-profit educational conglomerations with 72,000 students across 107 campuses, filed (along with 25 affiliated subsidiaries) a chapter 11 voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection. Corinthian reported $19.2 million of total assets and US$143.1 million of total debts, and plans to liquidate.
Congress rarely accomplishes anything these days, but the need to reform Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code seems to have “crossed over the aisle.” When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, America boasted the world’s dominant manufacturing economy. Corporate debt was mostly unsecured trade debt. Secured loans provided tangible asset financing for property, plant, and equipment.
What happens when a debtor, whose loan is pooled and securitized, files for bankruptcy? Are payments made to investors recoverable as fraudulent transfers or preferences?
In what appears to be a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that payments made to investors in a two tiered securitization structure commonly employed in commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”) transactions are largely protected from fraudulent or preferential transfer claims by the securities contract safe harbor set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v.
When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.
On March 16, 2015, the Spanish subsidiary of Banca Privada d’Andorra, Banco de Madrid, sought bankruptcy protection in the midst of a run on the bank by depositors. The run and bankruptcy were the result of FinCEN’s March 10, 2015, announcement that it would bar U.S. banks from providing correspondent banking services to Banca Privada d’Andorra or any bank that processes transactions for Banca Privada d’Andorra.
Recent legal and regulatory developments have raised issues for those considering a loan-to-own acquisition strategy, and have continued to impact both the structure of highly leveraged financings and the makeup of those willing to provide it.
In re RML -- Irrational Exuberance?
Insider status in U.S. bankruptcy carries with it significant burdens. Insiders face a one year preference exposure rather than the 90 day period applicable to non-insiders; insiders are by definition disinterested persons and may not be retained to provide professional services and transactions among debtors and their insiders are subject to heightened scrutiny under the entire fairness doctrine.
Several recent legal and regulatory developments in the U.S. will likely alter the makeup of the group of arrangers and financiers willing to arrange and provide financing for certain highly leveraged transactions, and also provide guidance to those considering a loan-to-own or related acquisition strategy, in order to help avoid potential pitfalls.
Revised Leveraged Lending Guidance
One deliberately ironic facet of the 2004 film Howard Hughes bio-pic The Aviator (the one with Leonardo DiCaprio) is the fact that the airlines fighting for world dominance in the 1940s were Howard Hughes’ TWA and Juan Trippe’s Pan Am. By the time of the movie, of course, both famous airlines were gone. Pan Am’s final descent into bankruptcy court ended in 1991. Following its own troubles (and two bankruptcies in the 1990s), TWA was acquired by American Airlines in 2001. But does the death of an airline mean an end to litigation? Of course not.