Often, corporate boards do not consider how to handle a company bankruptcy until the moment insolvency is looming.

In a recent decision authored by Chief Judge Easterbrook, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, Docket No. 11-3920 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012)) held that the licensee of a trademark does not necessarily lose the right to use the licensed marks when a debtor-licensor rejects the underlying license agreement in its bankruptcy case.  In so holding, the Court rejected a contrary decision reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.

In reaction to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that a licensee of patents, copyrights and trademarks loses its rights if the trustee or debtor in possession rejects a license under the Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor was the licensor, Congress enacted section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365(n)).

In 2009, the owners and management of The Philadelphia Inquirer, one of the nation's largest daily circulation newspapers, proposed a bankruptcy plan that attacked secured creditors' rights to bid their loans. When the District Court and the Third Circuit both approved the tactic, the plan gained national attention.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board announced the process for receiving and evaluating the initial resolution plans--also known as living wills--from the largest banking organizations operating in the United States. The agencies also gave a timetable for release of the public portion of such plans, which are due on July 2.

Baker Hostetler serves as court-appointed counsel to Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC (“BLMIS”). In January of 2011, the SIPA Trustee obtained approval from the United States Bankruptcy Court for a $5 billion settlement for BLMIS customers with allowed claims. At the same time, the Bankruptcy Court also issued a permanent injunction with respect to claims that were duplicative or derivative of the SIPA Trustee’s claims. After an appeal, the District Court affirmed the settlement and the injunction in March of 2012.

On May 29, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, resolved a high-profile circuit split regarding the right of secured creditors to credit bid in an asset sale under a chapter 11 plan. In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,¹ the Court held that a debtor cannot deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets free and clear of the secured creditor’s liens on those assets.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently found that a debtor’s transfer of property owned by a corporation in which the debtor allegedly held a 50% interest did not automatically constitute a transfer of assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. After the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint alleging that the debtor purposefully had executed a post-petition mortgage lien on certain real property owned by a corporation of which the debtor was a 50% owner.

Bankruptcy cases can be expensive affairs not only for the debtor, but also for creditors trying to obtain payment on their claims. A Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida recently approved a provision in a chapter 11 plan allowing for certain unsecured creditors to be reimbursed for their legal fees if their participation in the case helped maximize recoveries for other creditors, even though the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly allow for this kind of reimbursement.

Oftentimes in bankruptcy, when one entity files for bankruptcy relief, the subsidiaries or affiliates also file. Sometimes these entities are "substantively consolidated" for bankruptcy purposes, thus combining the assets and liabilities into a single pool and attributing them to a single entity. Substantive consolidation has been permitted when, for example, debtors have abused corporate formalities or creditors have treated the separate entities as a single economic unit and their affairs were hopelessly entangled.