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The Issue

The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.  

In its recent decision in Re Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander[1], the Supreme Court clarifies the interrelationship between the rule against double proof and the rule in Cherry v Boultbee. The Court considered in particular whether the rule in Cherry v Boultbee is (1) compatible with the principle against double proof, and (2) limited to seeking an indemnity in respect of sums actually paid.

Background

Can a U.S. patent licensee whose license has been rejected by a licensor under foreign law in a foreign bankruptcy rely on the protections of § 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code? On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion addressing this in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).5 The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S.

Where does liability under a Pensions Regulator Contribution Notice rank in an Employer's insolvency?

On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).1 The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S. patent licensees under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and that the failure of German insolvency law to protect patent licensees was “manifestly contrary” to United States public policy.

Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy may not always accomplish a debtor’s goal to shed ongoing contractual obligations and liabilities, especially when dealing with employee benefit plans. On October 13, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this issue in its opinion in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals, Inc.1 regarding the treatment of a pre-bankruptcy asset purchase agreement which contained a provision addressing the debtor-acquiror’s post-closing ERISA retiree benefit plan obligations to its new employees resulting from the transaction.

In its recent decision in Belmont Park Investments PTY Ltd v BNY Corporate trustee Services Ltd and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc,[1] the Supreme Court ruled in favour of investors, clarifying the limits of the anti-deprivation rule and holding that a commercially sensible transaction entered into in good faith and without the intention to evade insolvency laws should not infringe the anti-deprivation rule.

Background

HMRC is leading an increasingly tough stance against owners of businesses that have failed to pay their taxes before going bankrupt, says City law firm Wedlake Bell.

Figures from the Insolvency Service reveal that in the last year Bankruptcy Restriction Orders (or equivalent undertakings) were obtained against 443 bankrupts because of neglect of their business - a majority of which were alleged to have consistently failed to pay taxes to HMRC. This was an increase of 21% on last year and concern actions taken against sole traders and partnerships (Year ending March 31).

Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.

As many creditors have unfortunately discovered, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sue the creditor for certain payments – called preferences – that the creditor received from the debtor prior to the bankruptcy.