Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.

As many creditors have unfortunately discovered, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sue the creditor for certain payments – called preferences – that the creditor received from the debtor prior to the bankruptcy.

On June 28, 2011, in In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Enron’s redemption of its commercial paper prior to maturity fell within the definition of a “settlement payment” and was protected from avoidance under § 546(e)’s safe harbor provision in Title 11 of the United States Code.2

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.

Vendors who sell goods to customers are probably familiar with the issues that arise when the customer later files bankruptcy.

A recent Supreme Court judgement has confirmed that where an individual, Mr X, acts as director of company A, and company A is the sole director of company B, that will not necessarily make Mr X a “de facto” director of company B.

The Court decided that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director was not enough to render the individual a de-facto director, “something more” would be required, such as the director holding himself out in correspondence as a director of company B.

Rainy Sky SA et al v Kookmin Bank [2010] All ER (D) 255 (May) In our Spring 2010 e-news we reported on the case of Kookmin Bank which dealt with the interpretation of a refund guarantee between Kookmin Bank (the “Bank”) and the customer of an insolvent shipyard. The Bank issued a refund guarantee to secure obligations assumed by its customer Jinse Shipbuilding (the “Builder”). The agreement required the Bank to repay on demand all of the instalments paid by the buyer, Rainy Sky, on the occurrence of a default event under the refund guarantee.

Section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction & Regeneration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) outlaws pay when paid provisions, with one exception. It is permissible for a Contractor to use a pay when paid provision to deny payment of outstanding amounts due to its Sub-contractor where the Client at the top of the supply chain has gone bust. The general consensus is of course that this exception is unfair. It is essentially asking the Sub-contractors to act as insurers of both the main Contractor and Client insolvency.

In a welcome bit of good news for lenders, US District Court Judge Gold (Southern District of Florida) reversed the portion of the 2009 bankruptcy court decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy cases that had ordered the disgorgement of $403 million plus interest based on the holding that the amounts were received by certain lenders to the TOUSA parent in connection with a pre-petition transaction that constituted a fraudulent transfer.

On February 8, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion that will have a major impact on Chapter 11 plan confirmation. In consolidated appeals stemming from theIn re DBSD North America, Inc. bankruptcy case, the Second Circuit held that (1) the “gifting” aspect of the debtors’ plan of reorganization violated the absolute priority rule, and (2) the bankruptcy court did not err in designating a secured creditor’s vote as lacking “good faith” and disregarding that vote for purposes of confirmation.

The DBSD Plan