On June 28, 2011, in In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Enron’s redemption of its commercial paper prior to maturity fell within the definition of a “settlement payment” and was protected from avoidance under § 546(e)’s safe harbor provision in Title 11 of the United States Code.2
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.
Introduction
Prior to 25 March 2011, there was no judicial decision in Ireland on whether the holder of a floating charge could validly improve its position in the order of priority of payments, vis-à-vis preferential creditors, in circumstances where its floating charge crystallises (i.e. converts into a fixed charge) prior to commencement of the winding up of a company.
Vendors who sell goods to customers are probably familiar with the issues that arise when the customer later files bankruptcy.
InJ.D. Brian Ltd (in liquidation) & Others the High Court held that, where a floating charge crystallised prior to the commencement of a winding-up, the preferential creditors still had priority pursuant to in section 285 of the Companies Act 1963 over the holder of what had become a fixed charge.
The English court of appeal has held that a company should not be held to be balance sheet insolvent on the sole basis that its liabilities (including contingent and prospective liabilities) exceed its assets.
In BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail & Ors, the Court of Appeal considered in detail, for the first time, the construction of section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, which sets out circumstances in which a company can be deemed to be unable to pay its debts.
The relevant portions of section 123 provide as follows:
In Re: Michael McLoughlin Pharmacy Ltd. The examiner sought the High Court’s approval for a scheme of arrangement which limited his liability for negligence. The secured creditor objected as a matter of principle because such limitations of liability had become commonplace in schemes. The secured creditor made it clear that there was no suggestion of any negligence by the examiner in the particular case.
The court considered:
InDellway and Ors. v National Asset Management Agency & Ors., a number of companies and Paddy McKillen appealed a decision of the High Court in relation to the purported acquisition of €2∙1 billion in loans to the appellant companies by NAMA.
The appeal was brought on five grounds:
In a welcome bit of good news for lenders, US District Court Judge Gold (Southern District of Florida) reversed the portion of the 2009 bankruptcy court decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy cases that had ordered the disgorgement of $403 million plus interest based on the holding that the amounts were received by certain lenders to the TOUSA parent in connection with a pre-petition transaction that constituted a fraudulent transfer.
On February 8, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion that will have a major impact on Chapter 11 plan confirmation. In consolidated appeals stemming from theIn re DBSD North America, Inc. bankruptcy case, the Second Circuit held that (1) the “gifting” aspect of the debtors’ plan of reorganization violated the absolute priority rule, and (2) the bankruptcy court did not err in designating a secured creditor’s vote as lacking “good faith” and disregarding that vote for purposes of confirmation.
The DBSD Plan