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A party's right to terminate a contract in the event that the other party becomes insolvent is one of the most commonly seen termination rights in outsourcing and technology agreements. However, the effectiveness of such provisions in the future could change in agreements governing the provision of IT services, as the new Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 gives the Government the power to extend the law that currently protects supplies of gas, water, electricity and communication services during an organisation's insolvency to the supply of IT services.

The UK’s Insolvency Act 1986 sets out in s.123 various tests to determine whether a company should be deemed unable to pay its debts. The relevance of these tests to distressed companies is obvious: deciding as they do when it is appropriate to seek an administration order or present a winding up petition. They also help determine directors’ duties, antecedent transactions and issues such as wrongful and fraudulent trading.

On July 24, 2013 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, applying an “investment plus” test, concluded that a Sun Capital private equity investment fund was engaged in a “trade or business” for purposes of determining whether the fund could be jointly and severally liable under ERISA for the unfunded pension withdrawal liability of the portfolio company.1 Two Sun Capital investment funds, conveniently named Sun Capital Partners III, LP (“Fund III”) and Sun Capital Partners IV, LP, (“Fund IV”) (the “Sun Funds”) collectively owned 100 percent of Scott Brass, Inc.

We note with interest the Government's Discussion Paper, 'Transparency & Trust: Enhancing The Transparency of UK Company Ownership And Increasing Trust in UK Business', published yesterday.

In the Paper, the Government proposes to (amongst other things):

The absolute priority rule ordinarily prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from distributing any money or property to junior creditors and old equity investors unless all senior creditors have first been paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, old equity investors may attempt to receive new equity in the reorganized debtor in consideration for providing new (post-bankruptcy) investments in the debtor.

A look at the recent restructuring of the Co-operative Bank and EU proposals for mandatory reform

The Co-operative Bank announced in mid-June that it would need to carry out a forced listing of £300m new shares on the London Stock Exchange to fill a capital hole of around £1.5bn. Co-op's difficulties are said to have been triggered by mounting losses at Britannia Building Society - which Co-Op acquired in 2009 - that were highlighted when the bank failed to follow through on its planned acquisition of 632 Lloyds branches in February this year.

The EU Court of Justice held that Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 (“Directive 2008/94”) applies to pension benefits under a supplementary pension scheme, regardless of the cause of the employer’s insolvency, and without taking into account state pension benefits. Directive 2008/94 provides that member states must protect the pension interests of retirees when an employer becomes insolvent.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari by United Healthcare Insurance Company (“UHC”), which had requested judicial review of a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes the State of Texas. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion had held that ERISA did not preempt state claims brought by Access Mediquip (“Access”), a medical device provider, against UHC for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code (see Access Mediquip L.L.C. v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Co., No.

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

On January 31, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC1 declined to designate the votes of parties to a post-petition restructuring support agreement (i.e., a lock-up agreement), instead confirming the Debtors’ Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) based on the votes of such parties.