Debt for Equity Exchanges Outside Bankruptcy

The recession has highlighted a new risk for borrowers – the risk that a lender will be insolvent and default on its obligation to fund loans under the credit agreement. This has created unexpected issues under credit agreements, which were written at a time when lender insolvency was not a perceived risk.”34

The recent case of Mervyn’s LLC v Lubert-Adler Group IV, LLC, et al. (In re Mervyn’s Holdings, LLC),1 serves as a warning to sellers and equity firms participating in leveraged buyouts to be wary of the effect such buyouts will have on creditors of the target company.

On March 22, 2010, the Third Circuit released its long-awaited ruling in the Philadelphia Newspapers case regarding the applicability of credit bidding.

A new wrinkle in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases emerged recently when a U.S. bankruptcy judge issued an opinion directly at odds with the decisions previously rendered by certain English courts regarding priority of payment provisions (the “Priority Provisions”) with respect to collateral under the “Dante Program.”

The Dante Program

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its affiliate and subsidiary debtors (collectively, “Lehman”) filed their proposed chapter 11 plan of reorganization in their jointly administered chapter 11 proceedings on Monday, March 15, 2010 (Docket No. 7572). Monday was the last day for Lehman to file a plan pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code in order for Lehman to maintain the exclusive right to file and obtain confirmation of a plan.¹

Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, has returned to the public eye with a vengeance in light of a recent ruling by the influential Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware¹ and controversial pending amendments to Rule 2019 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Rules Committee”). The amendments will be the subject of a public hearing held in New York City on February 5, 2010.²

As we count down the days until the New Year, we are reminded of the momentous year we will leave behind us on December 31. While memorable for many things, 2009 may long be remembered as a year of record corporate insolvency. In 2009, General Motors, CIT, Chrysler, and Thornburg Mortgage filed four of the ten largest corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history. Equally notable are the number of corporate filings made in 2009.

Many companies secured their financing several years ago when the credit market featured advantageous pricing and loose loan covenants. Because these favorable terms would be impossible for borrowers to obtain in today’s lending environment, many viable companies with highly leveraged capital structures are looking for strategies to remove debt and, at the same time, to preserve, or “reinstate,” the favorable financing deals they secured before the markets crashed.

Courts are now being asked to examine transactions which were completed during the recent exuberant period. Despite the fact that the transactions in question may have been market standard at the time, because those transactions are being scrutinized during an unprecedented economic crisis, it appears that a disproportionate amount of finger pointing – and economic loss – is being directed at secured creditors. The result is a seeming erosion of secured creditors’ rights for the benefit of unsecured creditors.